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A STUDY OF THE TALMUDIC INTERPRETATION OF PROPHECY

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I

INTRODUCTION

THE CRITICAL ATTITUDE toward the phenomenon of prophecy, and the attempt to check the unconditional prophetic authority in the name of institutional religion and for the sake of the established law and discipline, is probably older than the Babylonian Exile and the Second Commonwealth. Yet it is that epoch that brings forth a definite turn in the attitude toward prophecy as an authoritative announcement of revelation.

"Since the day when the Temple was destroyed prophecy has been taken from the prophets and given to the wise."[1] In Ezra's system there is no place for new prophecy. The will of God is laid down in the Torah for all future generations. The interpretation of the Law is the task of the scholar to whom the meaning of the divine word is given and not of the prophet to whom God may reveal His secret. The new community is built upon spiritual order to be achieved by all; thus the interference of unpredictable enthusiam granted a few is excluded.[2] The canonization of the prophetic books that took place in the pre-Maccabean period[3] was said to have been necessitated by the departure of the prophetic spirit from Israel.[4] The written account of prophecy established an additional barrier against a possible appearance of new prophets.

This tendency, however, failed to hinder the rise of ecstatics in times of national peril who claimed the same source of authority as the Old Testament prophets. Josephus reports many prophets and visionaries

1. Megillah 17b; cf. Yer. Berakot 4d; Yer. Megillah 70d.
2. H. H. Schaeder, *Esra der Schreiber* (Tuebingen, 1930), pp. 3, 64 and passim.
3. S. Zeitlin, "An Historical Study of the Canonization of the Hebrew Scriptures," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, III (1932), 121 ff.
4. L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews* (Philadelphia, 1928), VI, 448.

who promised liberation from the Roman yoke or predicted the doom of Jerusalem.[5] At times Josephus himself takes on the role of a prophet, speaking as παρακαλῶν εἰς σωτηρίαν.[6]

Much has been said about the Apocalyptic literature which attempted to revive some of the prophetic elements, and which imitated prophetic writings. Here, again, the authority is "the word that calls me and the Spirit that is spilled upon me" (Enoch 91:1). The essence of the prophetic, or pseudo-prophetic word, is not what should be done but what should be expected in the future. The opposition of the rabbis toward the Apocalyptic groups is well known.

The revival of the prophetic authority in the early Church and the Christian propaganda among the Jews greatly intensified the discussion of problems concerning prophecy among the rabbis. Here the post-biblical Jewish conception of prophecy was brought to completion. In the early Christian communities we find charismatic leadership and growing interest in the prophetic sayings of the Bible. Early Christian writings stress prophetic motives in Jesus' life. The prophets of Israel are understood to have received their legitimacy from Jesus: οἱ προθῆται, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἔχοντες τὴν χάριν . . (*Epistle of Barnabas* 5:6). Scriptural prophecy is interpreted as foretelling the coming of Jesus, as condemning the Law and proclaiming a new epoch of faith. Scriptural Law itself is given a spiritual interpretation, supported by sayings of the prophets. Prophecy is taken as the main content of Israel's religion (cf. Justin, *Dialogue*, esp. ch. 52). The prophets appear as demanding the inclusion of the Gentiles within the community of Israel and as calling the Church the true Israel. Thus, in early Christianity, the center of gravity moved from the Law to the prophets (e.g. Justin, *Dialogue*, ch. 7).

The Church itself in its early history—beginning with St. Paul— experienced the difficulty of establishing the community upon the foundation of prophecy. Extemporaneous prophecy as an immediate mission from God, founded upon an authority beyond human control, was rivaled by the authority of the Church as a permanent institution headed by bishops and teachers. It became imperative to emphasize the order of the Church and to guard it against outbreaks of the Pneuma that might

5. Antt. XVIII. 4. 1; XX. 5. 1; 8. 10; Bell. Jud. II. 13. 4; 13. 5; VI. 5. 3.

6. Bell. Jud. III. 8. 9; IV. 10. 7. Cf. Wilhelm Weber, *Josephus und Vespasian* (Berlin, 1921), pp. 75 ff.

disturb its peace.[7] But the integration of the prophetic sources of religion and the institutional requirements of the Church was an internal problem of Christianity. However, facing opposition, especially from Jewish theology, the Church took it upon itself to represent the case of biblical prophecy and to guard prophetic religion against a faith which it considered to be anti-prophetic.

Prophecy had thus become a controversial topic. The Talmudic utterances on prophecy, therefore, do not reflect objective, detached observations. Instead, they constitute critical statements echoing a negative attitude to outbursts of uncontrolled pneuma in the past, on the one hand, and the defense of the Jewish doctrine against the new prophetic movement which disputed the ability of the Jews to understand the words of the prophets, on the other.

The Jewish response to the challenge of the Church was only partly expressed in outright discussions. It is generally accepted[8] that a number of Talmudic interpretations and Midrashic homilies are the result of polemics against Christian teachings, or attempts to strengthen the faith of those Jews who were exposed to Christian propaganda. Particularly in cities like Caesarea, the residence of the metropolitan of Palestine and Syria and at the same time the seat of the school of Bar Kappara and his disciple R. Hoshaya, teacher of R. Johanan, frequent discussions of theological problems are certain to have taken place.[9]

This study advances the suggestion that these polemics, besides affecting the understanding of single prophetic passages such as that on the Suffering Servant for instance, must also have profoundly influenced the Talmudic prophetology as a whole. They must have been a contributing factor towards the deepening of a critical tendency the beginnings of which reach back to periods previous to the Jewish-Christian polemics. Thus the far greater part of the rabbinic response consists of a presentation of the Jewish teachings (supported by Scripture) with a polemic implication, though without direct reference to the Christian

7. I. Cor. 14. Didache 15: 1. Cf. E. Meyer, *Ursprung und Anfaenge des Christentums* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1923), III, 253 ff.

8. E.g., by L. Baeck, A. Buechler, L. Ginzberg, S. Krauss, A. Marmorstein, S. Zeitlin.

9. Cf. R. Abbahu (third and fourth centuries), Abodah Zarah 4a on the necessity for the Palestinian Jews to study the Scriptures, because their adversaries urge them to discuss biblical problems; in this respect the Palestinians are said to differ from their Babylonian brethren.

doctrine. As this essay primarily intends to describe this Talmudic conception of prophecy as a whole, statements that go back to the pre-Christian time are not excluded. Nor does it limit itself to records of discussions between Christians and Jews (which have already been treated by others), including mainly remarks on prophecy and exemplary interpretations of prophetic writings according to Palestinian sources of the second, third, and fourth centuries, in as much as they might reflect a polemical or apologetical attitude. (Some Babylonian Talmudic sources are used only by way of comparison).

Before presenting a few typical motives of Talmudic prophetology, two points must be emphasized:

Firstly: Talmudic criticism of prophecy by no means lessened the esteem of the prophetic writings. All the books of the canon of Jewish Scriptures were considered of equal importance as the source and the expression of divine Law. As to prophetic teachings—ethical, messianic and theological—it has rightly been maintained that they became part and parcel of the rabbinic doctrine.[10] This study, however,—with one exception—does not intend to interpret the rabbinic discussions of prophetic *teachings*, but is solely concerned with the rabbinic comments on the *phenomenon* of prophecy and on the *form* of religious perception as represented by the prophetic personality.

Secondly: It would be unsatisfactory indeed to state that between the prophetic and the rabbinic views there is merely "a difference in form," and that "the conception of the unwritten Torah is the reproduction of prophecy." It is equally insufficient to say that there is only a difference of method between Ezra and the prophets, but "no difference of principle," unless "principle" is understood in a very general sense.[11] In so complicated a theological problem as prophecy, it would be erroneous to ignore the shift in the scale of values which occurs through the substitution of one "form" and "method" by another. The prophet speaks his

10. Cf. L. Ginzberg, *Eine unbekannte juedische Sekte* (New York, 1922), pp. 265, 275; *Mekomah shel ha-Halakah* (Jerusalem, 1931), p. 11; Ch. Tchernowitz, *Toledot ha-Halakah* (New York, 1934), I, 306; L. Finkelstein, *The Pharisees* (Philadelphia, 1938), II, 463.

11. Travers Herford, *Talmud and Apocrypha* (London, 1933), p. 70; *Pharisaism* (London, New York, 1912), p. 65. An understanding of this problem is shown by J. Z. Lauterbach, "The Ethics of the Halakah," *Yearbook, Central Conference of American Rabbis*, XXIII (1913), 254. Cf. also C. G. Montefiore, *Rabbinic Literature and Gospel Teachings* (London, 1930), pp. 254 f.

word, seized by the hand of God, shocked by the experience of unmediated revelation, stirred by the absoluteness and finality of the divine command. As a result of this experience, the prophet was "under special commission" from God to preach to his people.[12] In assuming that this "form" can be replaced by a less emotional, less revolutionary, less radical "form" without substantial consequences for the "contents," one would fail to understand the nature of prophecy. The problem of prophecy and Talmud cannot be presented merely by employing the principle of a harmless change from one form to another. It can only be approached if allowance is made for a transition in religious thinking, a most decisive turn, not only in the history of Jewish religion, but in the history of religious movements in general.

II

GENERALIZATION OF PROPHETIC EXPERIENCE

The rabbis distinctly consider the prophets as a group which, in past history, took a special place beside the priests and the scribes (e.g. R. Meir, second century, Sifre Deut. 309). Israel is asked to hearken "to the commandments, to the words of the Torah, to the words of prophecy," etc. (R. Abba b. Kahana, a disciple of R. Johanan, Lam. R., Petihta 1). The psalms composed by Moses "under the order of prophecy" were not included in the Torah, so as not to confound words of Torah with words of prophecy" (Midr. Ps. on 90:1). The phenomenon of prophecy and details of prophetic activity are studied by several teachers. The inauguration of the prophets is discussed, and the messages of different prophets compared.[13] There are comments on the state of consciousness in different prophets,[14] on the field of activity of several contemporary prophets,[15] on their names, places of origin, and family relations,[16]

12. W. F. Albright, *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel* (Baltimore, 1942), p. 24. Cf. H. H. Rowley, "The Nature of Prophecy in the Light of Recent Study," *The Harvard Theological Review*, XXXVIII (1945), 22 ff.

13. E.g., R. Judah b. Simon (fourth century) about Isaiah, Micah, Amos: Pesikta ed. Buber 125b.

14. E.g., R. Jose b. Zimra (third century) and R. Joshua b. Nehemiah (fourth century), Midr. Ps. on 90:1.

15. E.g., Pesikta Rabb. ed. Friedmann 129b, on Jeremiah, Zephaniah and Huldah.

16. E.g., R. Johanan (third century), Lev. R. 6. 6; Lam. R. Petihta 24. Cf. Ulla, Megillah 15a.

on the collection of prophetical writings,[17] on the chronology of prophets[18] and the order of the prophetic books in the canon,[19] on the style and form of prophetic expressions.[20] The manifold discussions on the subject in Talmudic literature show that the rabbis were aware of the particular character of prophecy and that they tried to understand the unique position of the classical prophets.

At the same time, however, the rabbis follow a conception of prophecy as a *universal* revelation of God. The Talmud interchangeably uses the terms prophecy, Ruah ha-Kodesh, "the holy spirit," denoting "a universal indwelling of God in the world, his constant self-revelation to man," and Shekinah, designating the abiding presence of God by the side of man.[21] These terms of divine revelation enable the rabbis to generalize the phenomenon of inspiration. They are described as acting not only in prophets, but in many other persons throughout biblical times. The patriarchs and the four mothers, Tamar, Joshua, Rahab, Samson, Hannah, Samuel's son Joel, David and Solomon, and many others, are considered by the rabbis as inspired by the spirit of prophecy. Divine inspiration is granted not only to individuals, but, at times, to the people of Israel as a whole as long as it deserves this privilege. As a reward for their belief in God, the holy spirit rested upon the Israelites at the Red Sea (Mekilta on 14:31). The sin of the golden calf, according to R. Phinehas b. Hama (fourth century), caused the holy spirit in Israel to be replaced by a guiding angel (Exod. R. 32.1). Commenting on Isa. 7:1 and 8:16, R. Samuel b. Nahman (third century) said that king Ahaz closed down the houses of prayer and the houses of study, so that the knowledge of the Torah may cease and God "withdraw his Shekinah" from Israel (Gen. R. 41.3). The festival of "Drawing of Water," according to R. Joshua b. Levi (third century), derived its name from the phenomenon that from there Israel "drew holy spirit" (Yer. Sukkah 55a). Related is a group of midrashic texts which presents the

17. E.g., R. Johanan, Cant. R. 4. 22. Cf. Megillah 14a and Yer. Megillah 70d.

18. E.g., Baba Batra 14b; Pesikta ed. Buber 128b.

19. Baba Batra 15a.

20. E.g., R. Isaac (third and fourth centuries), Sanhedrin 89a; Gen. R. 67.9. R. Judah b. Simon (fourth century), Pesikta ed. Buber 126a; Lev. R. 10. 2. Cf. Gen. R. 44. 7; Pesikta ed. Buber 117b.

21. J. Abelson, *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature* (London, 1912), pp. 215, 225. Cf. H. Parzen, "The Ruah Hakodesh in Tannaitic Literature," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, N. S., XX (1929-1930), 51 ff.

holy spirit as guiding, and revealing divine opinion, criticism, or consolation at certain occasions in biblical times. It is in cases like these that the holy spirit uses Scriptural passages as a form of expression, applying them to these events.[22]

From this more general conception of pneumatic experience, the rabbis challenge the uniqueness of the prophets and the exclusiveness of their visions. They emphasize that, through certain occurences in Israel's past, God has revealed more of his glory than in the visions of the prophets: e.g., "The maidservant at the Red Sea saw more than Ezekiel and all the other prophets," states R. Eliezer b. Hyrkanus (first and second centuries). "By the ministry of the Prophets" God "used similitudes" (Hos. 12:11); Ezekiel had only "visions of God" (1:1); but the people at the Red Sea, "as soon as they saw Him, they recognized Him" (Mekilta on 15:2). R. Berekiah (fourth century) elaborated upon the same theme: "Moses had to prostrate himself and to supplicate before God" until he was given to perceive divine "resemblance" only "by a sign"; but Israel at the Red Sea was granted unmediated vision (Exod. R. 23.15).

According to the rabbis, the prophets are not the exclusive messengers of God. R. Aha b. Hanina (third century) has God saying to the prophets: Do you think I have no messengers if you do not accept to be my messengers? In this case I will execute my message "by a snake, by a scorpion, by a frog" (Exod. R. 10.1).

This motive, generalizing the phenomenon of prophecy, did not originate from a polemical intention. It can be assumed, however, that at times it was employed in that spirit. Early Christianity and other prophetic movements stressed the element of inspiration and enthusiasm. Pneumatic experiences were granted the elevated rank of authoritative prophecies. Men filled with the holy spirit were considered prophets. The rabbis question the absoluteness of prophetic vision. They give prophetic occurrences a more general character, and lessen the difference between prophecy in the strict sense of the word and an expression of the divine presence among men. This enabled them to counteract the

22. E.g., Bileam's plans are rejected by the holy spirit by quoting Prov. 17:1 (Tanhuma ed. Buber IV, 141). Jephthah's sacrifice was criticised by the holy spirit by quoting Jer. 19:5 (Tanhuma ed. Buber III, 114). At the occasion of the dedication of the Temple and Solomon's prayer, the holy spirit quoted Eccles. 4:2 praising the dead king David (Tanhuma ed. Buber II, 225).

revolutionary and challenging position inherent in prophecy, and to refute the charismatic privileges granted to messengers of God in early Christian thinking.

III

THE STATE OF WORTHINESS

"When the last prophets, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, died, the holy spirit departed from Israel."[23] But to the rabbis, the end of the era of prophecy ("holy spirit" in the strict sense of classical prophecy) did not mean the end of revelation or of direct relationship between God and Israel. There were other forms of divine communication with the affairs of men that took the place of original prophecy: holy spirit in a more general sense, awareness of divine presence (Shekinah), and Bat Kol, the "heavenly voice" that from time to time "reveals to Israel things hidden from human knowledge"[24] and announces the will of God. "It was given them to hear by means of the Bat Kol."[25]

The Talmudic sources tell of some instances where such communication took place after the cessation of Old Testament prophecy: In the time of the Second Temple, Simeon the Just and Johanan the High Priest perceived a "heavenly voice" (Tosefta Sotah 13.5-6. Cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 13.10.3). Three and a half years before the destruction of the Temple a heavenly voice admonished Israel to repent, with the words of Jer. 3:14; when no repentance was achieved, the voice called the words of Hosea 5:15 (Lam. R. Petihta 25). A heavenly voice proclaimed that Hillel and Samuel ha-Katan were "worthy of the holy spirit" (Tosefta Sotah 13.3-4; Yer. Abodah Zarah 42c).[26] The dispute between the schools of Hillel and Shammai, each of whom contended that the Law was in accordance with their views, was solved by a heavenly voice: "Both are

23. Tosefta Sotah 13.2; Yoma 9b; Sanhedrin 11a. In Yoma 21b, the absence of Shekinah and prophecy is mentioned among the five things that distinguished the Second Temple from the First. In Eccles. R. 12.8, the words, "the spirit returneth to God" (Eccles. 12:7), are interpreted to mean the holy spirit that left the city with its destruction.

24. L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews* VI, 442, note 36.

25. Tosefta Sotah 13.2.

26. According to the opinion of the sages, R. Eliezer b. Hyrkanus also was considered worthy of the holy spirit.

the words of the living God, etc." (Erubin 13b). Jonathan b. Uziel, who translated the Prophets into Aramaic, is challenged by a heavenly voice: "Who is it that revealed my secrets to men?" A translation of the Hagiographa is prevented by the interference of a heavenly voice (Megillah 3a). R. Johanan b. Zakkai foresees the destruction of the Temple (Yoma 39b). In the century after the destruction of the Temple, R. Gamaliel II is credited with an utterance inspired by the holy spirit (Tosefta Pesahim 1.27; Yer. Abodah Zarah 40a).[27] After having caused the death of Eleazar of Modiin, Bar Kokba perceives a heavenly voice which repeats the prophecy of Zechariah (1:17) and announces his doom (Yer. Taanit 68df). Both R. Akiba and R. Meir are said to have been granted the holy spirit (Lev. R. 21.7; 9.9). Elisha b. Abuyah, R. Meir's teacher, hears a heavenly voice quoting Jer. 3:22 (Yer. Hagigah 77b). R. Simeon b. Yohai hears a heavenly voice announcing the fate of a bird. In one of his miraculous actions he is guided by the holy spirit (Yer. Shebiit 38d). R. Johanan (third century) derives from Isa. 30:21 the permission to follow the guidance of a heavenly voice (Megillah 32a). I. Sam. 28:3 spoken by school children, is taken by R. Johanan and R. Simeon b. Lakish as a heavenly voice intending to inform them of the death of Mar Samuel in Babylonia (Yer. Shabbat 8c).[28]

There is no doubt that the rabbis were aware of the distinction between the period of Scriptural prophecy and their own time. R. Reuben (third century) compares the prophetic period to the presence of the king in the city, the time thereafter to the statue of the king: "The statue cannot do what the king himself can do" (Cant. R. 8.11). But this "remnant of prophecy," (*ibid.*) though small, was strong enough to support the consciousness of the rabbis that living revelation is not altogether a matter of the past and that God speaks to men, not only through the medium of the Scriptures, but also in direct communication.

The difference, however, between prophetic revelation and revelation by means of the holy spirit and the heavenly voice is of great importance for the understanding of Talmudic prophetology. The Talmud employs the motive of the "worthiness" of a man to receive such revelation. A

27. Tosefta Niddah 5. 15 mentions a prediction of Gamaliel II without employing the term holy spirit.

28. *Ibid:* a casual remark by a woman is considered a heavenly voice by R. Jonah and R. Jose (fourth century) indicating that the sick R. Aha was still alive.

man is granted the holy spirit by studying the Torah: R. Joshua b. Levi (third century) e.g., regarded the presence of God as implied in the presence of the Torah (Cant. R. 8.13). According to R. Aha (fourth century) a man becomes worthy of the holy spirit by devoting himself to study for the purpose of observance (Lev. R. 35.6). Similarly R. Judan (fourth century): Whoever speaks the words of the Torah in public is worthy of the holy spirit to rest upon him (Cant. R. 1.8).[29] The welcoming of one's teacher is "as if he had welcomed the divine presence (Yer. Erubin 22b; cf. Mekilta on 18:12). The divine presence is also a result of the observance of the Law and of the doing of good deeds. In the opinion of R. Nehemiah (second century), whosoever accepts one commandment "with faith" deserves that the holy spirit rests upon him (Mekilta on 14:31). The giver of charity to the poor becomes worthy of the divine presence (Midr. Ps. on 17:15).

The presupposition of a state of "worthiness" in the Talmudic prophetology turns divine revelation into a culmination, an end of a process. It becomes the result of preparation achieved by study and good deeds, in contradistinction to Scriptural prophecy, where God's call to the prophet marked the beginning of a process. The prophet was moved by a divine pathos; he was forced and controlled by "a strong hand"; his mission revolutionized his life. In the Talmudic literature, the resting of the holy spirit upon a man means no sudden experience of revelation, overwhelming him by its newness and immediateness.[30] Rather is it an awareness of divine presence, entering the human sphere with the aim to help and to guide. It establishes a more constant sphere of co-ordination and correlation between God and man. It might be assumed that, in these comments on divine revelation, the rabbis, besides having other reasons, were moved also by the desire to challenge the authority of sudden outbreaks of prophetic spirit which intended to give an unexpected turn to the revealed and established religious order, a motive which occurred in all pneumatic movements and played a great part in the early Christian conception of prophecy.

29. Cf. the statement of R. Phinehas b. Jair (second century) according to which the Torah, through different stages leads to the acquisition of the holy spirit and finally to the resurrection of the dead (Abodah Zarah 20b).

30. Cf. R. Joshua b. Levi (third century): In the first revelation to Moses, God spoke in the voice of Moses' father in order not to frighten him (Exod. R. 3. 1).

IV

THE CRITICISM OF THE PROPHETIC PERSONALITY

The prophets attempted to bring about a change in the life of the people by the proclamation of the word of God. The Talmud emphasizes the fact that this was not a sufficient means to reach the desired aim. It is from this angle that the Talmud, and especially the school of R. Johanan (third century), criticizes the activity of the prophets. Moses' prophecy during the forty years did not have the power to bring about Israel's redemption; this (Israel's redemption) was brought about by Pharaoh, who "took off his signet ring from his hand and put it upon Joseph's hand" (Gen. 41:42; R. Johanan, Lam. R. 4.22). Similarly, R. Johanan's colleague, R. Simeon b. Lakish contrasts the activity of the prophets of Elijah's time with the action of King Ahasuerus (Esther 3:10) which indirectly caused the redemption of Israel (*ibid*). R. Isaac, a disciple of R. Johanan (third and fourth centuries), in a comment on Ps. 137:2, ascribes to the Babylonian Exile the power to lead Israel to repentance, while the prophecies of Jeremiah remained unheeded (Pesikta Rabb. ed. Friedmann 136a).[31] According to R. Abba b. Kahana, a disciple of R. Johanan, "all the forty-eight prophets and seven prophetesses that prophesied in Israel" were not able to lead them back to the right way, while the decree of Ahasuerus led them back to the right way (Megillah 14a).

In these discussions, the Talmudic teachers point to the primarily historic factors that accounted for achievements denied to the prophets. We may assume that the rabbis had knowledge of the fact that the prophets had been instrumental in making Israel conscious of the meaning of historic catastrophes. It is all the more significant that they stress the influence of historic events as such and not of their interpretation by the prophets. It might be suggested that the rabbis, particularly in the third century, emphasized the power and authority of *historic reality* in an attempt to counteract conceptions of unconditional authority of the *prophetic word*.

The rabbis consider the authority of the prophet as limited. Yet the prophet as the messenger of the word of God, according to the Talmud, tends to overestimate his power. The rabbis, therefore, have God reprimand the prophets for statements that are interpreted as haughty and

31. Cf. also Lam. R. 4. 22.

self-assured. R. Levi, a disciple of R. Johanan, takes Moses' word to the judges: "And the cause that is too hard for you ye shall bring unto me and I will hear it" (Deut. 1:17) as an expression of self-pride. God, according to Levi, reproaches Moses, telling him that soon he will be confronted by a case which he will not be able to decide, but which could be decided by his pupil's pupil (Num. 27:5). The prophet Samuel, according to R. Levi, is reprimanded by God for saying: "I am the seer" (I. Sam. 9:19). God says to him: I will show you that you are no seer. The words, "For man looketh on the outward appearance but the Lord looketh on the heart" (*ibid.* 16:7) are understood by R. Levi as God's corrective answer to Samuel's pride (Midr. Samuel ch.14; Sifre Deut., 17).

The prophets are also shown as failing to understand the true nature of the judgment of God. Jeremiah and Daniel, who witnessed the fall of their nation are, according to R. Joshua b. Levi (third century), stirred by the victory of the heathens and the enslavement of Israel; in describing the divine attributes, therefore, they change the established formula, Deut. 10:17; Jeremiah omits the attribute of awfulness (32:18); Daniel omits the attribute of might (9:4). Only the Great Assembly that followed the age of the prophets was able to re-interpret God's actions and to re-establish the traditional formula (Yoma 69b).[32]

By pointing to human weaknesses in the prophets and to the limits of their understanding of divine actions, the rabbis pursue the tendency of checking doctrines which recognize the prophet as the central figure in the realm of Revelation and his book as the principal expression of God's will. Against the Christian theory which saw a consequence of Israel's sin in the Law of the Pentateuch (e.g., Justin, *Dialogue* ch. 17) and which placed prophecy and the prophetic books in the center of the Bible, we find a Talmudic statement according to which it was only Israel's sin that made it necessary to give them more books than the Pentateuch (R. Hunia, Eccles. R. 1.34).[33]

V

PROPHECY AND LAW

The prophet speaks because he has heard the voice of God that very hour. The word of God comes unexpectedly, at times against all human

32. Cf. R. Phinehas b. Hama (fourth century), Yer. Berakot 11c; Yer. Megillah 74c.
33. Cf. R. Adda b. Hanina, Nedarim 22b.

anticipation. The power of the prophetic message emanates from this presence of revelation.

In speaking of the prophetic mission, the Talmud repeatedly stresses the idea that only the *delivery* of the message is a matter of "today"; the message itself originated on Sinai and has been waiting for its hour ever since. The revelation on Sinai, the source of the divine Law, is also the source of prophecy. The "great voice" on Sinai (Deut. 5:19) is interpreted by R. Simeon b. Lakish (third century) as the origin of all future prophecy (Exod. R. 28.4). According to R. Samuel b. Nahman (third century), Moses not only proclaimed his own words but also those of all the later prophets as well (Exod. R. 42.7). Commenting on Deut. 29:14, R. Isaac (third and fourth centuries) says: The messages which the prophets were to prophesy in each and every generation were received on Mount Sinai (Exod. R. 28.4). Isaiah is quoted as having said: I received my prophecy on Sinai but "now the Lord God hath sent me and his spirit (Isa. 48:16), which means that until then he had not been given permission to make his prophecy public (Exod. R. 28.4). The "Merkabah" vision of Ezekiel, according to R. Berekiah (fourth century), had its source in the revelation on Sinai (Cant. R. 1.29). Malachi had been in possession of his prophecy since the revelation on Sinai, but had to wait for this hour to proclaim it (Exod. R. 28.4).

In these comments we may recognize the Talmudic criticism of an important characteristic of prophecy: its immediateness, its unforeseen instant breaking into a historic situation. By tracing back the origin of the prophetic message to the revelation on Sinai, the Talmud introduces the element of tradition into prophecy, thus restraining the danger inherent in uncontrolled prophetism. Moreover, in the Talmudic emphasis on the connection between the two phenomena—prophecy and Sinai —a polemical tendency becomes apparent. The early Christian interpretation of prophecy saw in Jesus the event to which all the prophets had pointed (e.g. Acts 3:24; Justin, *Apology* 61). Jesus appears as the termination and culmination of prophecy. To see that events have occurred and are occurring as was prophesied appears to Justin as "the greatest and truest proof" of Christianity (*Apology* 30). Thus, in reading the prophets the early Church stressed the element of foresight and prediction. The Talmud criticizes the foundation of this interpretation and, refering to certain aspects in the prophetic books themselves, presents the prophets as witnesses to the first revelation of God to Israel.

According to the Talmud, the Scriptural prophecies are not essentially predictions but confirmations and elucidations of the work of Moses, in whom were combined the authority of prophecy and Law.

It is not only the source that, in the Talmudic conception, is common to prophecy and to Law. Even the task of the prophet is understood to be the same as the task of the interpreter of the Law: to teach the Torah to Israel. The Talmud pictures the prophets as teachers. The purpose of the prophetic words on future blessings was to foster the study of the Law in Israel (R. Samuel b. Nahman, third century, Eccles. R. 1.27).[34] In the Talmudic interpretation, prophetic words of general and comprehensive nature are referred to a specific law or observance. "To walk humbly with thy God" (Micah 6:8), according to R. Eleazar b. Pedat (third century), means "to escort the dead to the grave and to lead the bride to the bridal chamber" (Sukkah 49b).[35] "Seek the Lord while he may be found" (Isa. 55:6) leads R. Abbahu (third and fourth centuries) to the question: "Where is he to be found?" which he answers: "In the houses of prayer and of study" (Yer. Berakot 8d). Similarly, to "forsake the Lord" or, to leave his presence, of which the prophets speak, is interpreted by the rabbis as disobedience of a certain commandment or usage.[36] The prophetic phrase, "word of God," is identified with "the word of the Torah." "I have put My words in thy mouth" (Isa. 51:16), according to R. Levi (third century), refers to the Torah (Pesikta ed. Buber 140b).[37] When the prophet has God say "which I command not" (e.g., Jer. 19:5), the Talmud adds: "In the Torah" (R. Eleazar b. Jose, second century, Sifre Deut., 148).

The same principle underlies the interpretation of the prophetic term, "knowledge of God." To "(I desire) knowledge of God rather than burnt-offerings" (Hos. 6:6) R. Simeon b. Yohai (second century) remarks: "The words of the Torah are dearer to me than burnt-offerings and peace-offerings" (Abot de R. Nathan ed. Schechter II. 11b). The term Torah or the Torah of God, when used by the prophet in a broad and extensive sense, is related by the rabbis to the "Written Law." The term Torot or Torah with the subsequent synonym is understood

34. Cf. Yalkut Shimeoni on Isa. 64:3.

35. Cf. the same rabbi's comment on Isa. 23:18, Pesahim 118b.

36. See R. Hoshaiah (about 200) on Jer. 2:5, Pesikta ed. Buber 119 a; R. Ammi (a disciple of Hoshaiah) on Isa. 1:28, Berakot 8a.

37. Cf. Yer. Taanit 68a.

as the Written and the Oral Law. If the parallel part of the sentence contains an unspecified, general term like "statute," the rabbis offer a specific translation, stressing a concrete implication.[38] A great many Talmudic comments consider the motive, Torah and study of Torah, to be the implication of prophetic sentences or phrases of a general theological character.[39]

Here, as well as in other chapters of Talmudic interpretation of the Bible, we find different tendencies at work. Besides the tendency to arrest anthropomorphism, we can clearly recognize the attempt to counteract pneumatic irrationalism. The rabbis pointed out indefinite, vague, and more theoretical prophetic terms which lent themselves to support pneumatic religions, and translated them into concrete demands. Terms like "Knowledge of God," "Covenant," "Way of the Lord," opened the way to uncontrolled religious emotional experience. The Talmud, without losing sight of the deeper issues in the relation of Man to God,[40] stresses "study of the Torah" and "observance of the Law" as the concrete meaning of "Covenant" and "Knowledge of God," thus demonstrating the common task of prophet and rabbi.

Closely related is the motive which shows certain prophets as having instituted some customs and usages.[41] A great number of regulations is assumed by the rabbis to have been transmitted by Haggai, Zachariah, and Malachi.[42] Yet, in the opinion of the rabbis, the prophet, while interpreting the Law, does not enjoy any privilege qua prophet; he is, like the rabbi, subject to the same statutes that regulate the law-finding procedure. Thus the prophet is not considered the originator of new laws which are not indicated in the Torah, nor has he the right to abrogate or to alter the Law.[43]

38. E.g., R. Judan (fourth century) on Isa. 5:24, Pesikta ed. Buber 121b.; R. Isaac (third and fourth centuries) on Isa. 24:5, Pesikta ed. Buber 98a; R. Judah the Patriarch (second century) on Mal. 2:6, Yer. Peah 15b.

39. E.g., R. Eleazar b. Pedat (third century) on Jer. 33:25, Pesahim 68b; R. Isaac (third and fourth centuries) on Isa. 10:27, Sanhedrin 94b; R. Judah b. Pazzi (fourth century) on Hos. 8:3, Pesikta ed. Buber 121a.

40. E.g., R. Akiba (second century) remarks to Ezek. 36:25 and Jer. 17:13, that Israel in purifying itself stands before God (Mishnah Yoma 8. 9). R. Hela (fourth century) heard a child reading Amos 4:13 and was reminded of man's critical position before God (Hagigah 5b).

41. Cf. Z. H. Chajes, *Torat Nebiim* (Zolkiew, 1836), ch. IX.

42. Erubin 104b; Sukkah 44a; Rosh ha-Shanah 19b; Nazir 53 a; Zebahim 62a; Hullin 137b; Bekorot 58a.

43. Temurah 16a; cf. Chajes, *op. cit.*, p. 18d, and L. Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, VI, 170.

As it is the aim of both the Law and prophecy to teach Israel the Torah, the authority of the sage who devotes himself mainly to the Law is considered by the Talmud to be higher than the authority of the prophet who combines other activities with the teaching of the Law. Therefore, according to R. Tanhum b. Hiyya (third century), the prophet has to prove his authority by a sign or a wonder (Deut. 13:2), "showing the king's seal," while the sage does not need to show the king's seal; he speaks with the authority of the Law (Deut. 17:11; Yer. Berakot 3b). Prophetic devices, miracles, signs, are not permitted to interfere in the deliberation of the sages or to challenge their vote. In a discussion of susceptibility to Levitical uncleanness of a particularly constructed oven, R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanus (first and second centuries) tried to prove his dissenting opinion by many arguments; however, when the sages declined to accept them, he resorted to offering proofs by miraculous deeds and, finally, by a Voice from Heaven. The miracles happened; the Heavenly Voice spoke, confirming Eliezer's viewpoint; but R. Joshua b. Hananiah arose and exclaimed: "It is not in heaven" (Deut. 30:12); the Torah had already been given at Mount Sinai; we pay no attention to a Heavenly Voice, because Thou hast long since written in the Torah. "After the majority must one incline" (Exod. 23:2; Baba Mezia 59b). The realm of Law is independent. When scholars deliberate a matter of law, no supernatural faculties may interfere. The right to ignore such forces is given the sages—with the revelation on Sinai.

Prophetic qualities, when arising among the rabbis, are ascribed by them to adherence to tradition. At times when sages took the opportunity to foretell the future, they rejected the title of a prophet and explained their power as resulting not from a divine illumination but from following the tradition: "I am not a prophet neither a prophet's son, but I hold this tradition from my teacher. . . ."[44]

VI

THE PROPHETS AND ISRAEL

To the prophets the relation of God to the people of Israel was determined by a passionate love. This love, however, was not uncon-

44. R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanus (first and second centuries), Erubin 63a; R. Eleazar b. Arak (same time), Midr. Ps. on 1:3.

ditional. The center of the prophet's thinking is the divine plan.[45] The self-confident, complacent life of Israel—as of all nations—appears to the prophet as rebellion against God. Israel misinterprets God's love by identifying God with his nation. The pride and disobedience of Israel, or any nation, provoke the judgment of God.[46] The prophet who identifies himself with the divine cause suffers with God the grave disappointment over Israel's sin. He becomes the messenger of Israel's doom. God will not pardon any more (Amos 8:2). The day of the Lord will come upon all proud and lofty ones (Isa. 2:17). God will utterly consume all things from the face of the earth (Zeph 1:2-7). Man is bowed down but God exalted through justice (Isa. 5:15-16). The prophet's hope that "the remnant will return" and that God will renew his love (Hos. 2:21; Isa. 14:1; 30:18) does not diminish the seriousness and the absoluteness of the prophetic criticism of Israel.

The Talmud, to be sure, takes up this line of prophetic criticism; its statements on the weight of Israel's sin reveal a deep consciousness of the critical position of Israel before God. R. Joshua b. Levi (third century), interpreting Jer. 3:19, lets God speak to Israel: I wanted to defend you, but you caused me to denounce you and to declare you guilty (Tanhuma ed. Buber II.86). R. Johanan (third century) reads Malachi 3:5 and exclaims: Is there a remedy for a servant whom his master brings to judgment and hastens to witness against him? (Hagigah 5a). R. Ammi or R. Assi (both disciples of R. Johanan), in interpreting Ezek. 21:31, let the angels remind God of Israel's virtue in accepting the Torah on Sinai, but God answers by referring to its sin in having "lowered the exalted and exalted the low" and put the idol into the Temple (Gittin 7a). R. Abba b. Kahana (a disciple of R. Johanan) remarked on Ezek. 16:31: Jeremiah "the son of the corrupted who did righteous deeds" (Rahab) was sent to reprimand Israel, "the son of the righteous who did corrupted deeds" (Pesikta ed. Buber 111b). This definite awareness of sin opens the way to the insight that God's final word is not judgment nor condemnation but salvation. This idea is expressed by R. Isaac (disciple of R. Johanan) in the form of a dialogue between Abraham and God after the destruction of the Temple. Abraham pleads for Israel in the words of Jer. 11:15, but God rejects every plea in Israel's defense.

45. Cf. Abraham Heschel, *Die Prophetie* (Krakow, 1936), p. 68 and *passim*.

46. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York, 1943), II, 25 and *passim*.

Only when Abraham finally fears that "there is no remedy for them," a Heavenly Voice quotes Jer. 11:16, interpreting it: "as an olive tree has its future at its end, so is Israel's future at its end" (Menahot 53b).

Yet this prophetic motive of criticism of Israel and of salvation as the *final* act in history is not the only motive in the Talmudic discussion of the "Israel" problem. The Talmudic teachers challenge the prophetic theme of a possible rejection of Israel and of the catastrophic turn of its history. The Talmudic idea of "withdrawal of the divine presence" as the punishment for sin is by no means identical with the judgment proclaimed by the prophets. The relation between God and Israel appears to the rabbis to be of a more steadfast character, not affected by an ever imminent possibility of suspension. The contrast between God and Israel is bridged over by the idea of correlation and harmonious correspondence. The conception of Israel as a cosmic category and necessary condition for the existence of the world, a conception which matured in the Talmudic time,[47] did not permit the continuance of the prophetic questioning—not even a temporary questioning—of Israel's right to existence. The idea of sympathy, therefore, that has been observed in biblical prophecy,[48] underwent a significant change in Talmudic theology. The prophet participated in the divine feelings and emotions; they were the motives of the prophet's own attitude and action. According to the Talmudic thinking, it is God who takes part in the fate of Israel, suffering with them,[49] accompanying them in their Exiles,[50] and awaiting with them the day of salvation which will, as it were, redeem divinity itself.[51]

Thus the origin of the prophetic mission, according to the Talmudic

47. E.g., R. Reuben, R. Berekiah and R. Abbahu (third and fourth centuries), Lev. R. 36.4. On the connection of this conception with the ethical view of creation, cf. L. Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, v, 67.

48. A. Heschel, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

49. E.g., R. Jonathan b. Eleazar (third century) on Ezek. 5:13 (Berakot 59a); R. Simeon b. Lakish (third century) on Amos 5:1 and Jer. 9:16 (Pesikta ed. Buber 120b); R. Berekiah (fourth century) on Isa. 40:1 (Pesikta ed. Buber 128b); cf. R. Jose b. Halafta (second century), Berakot 3a.

50. E.g., R. Simeon b. Yohai (second century) on I. Sam. 2:27 and Isa. 43:14 (Megillah 29a); R. Isaac (third and fourth centuries) on Jer. 44:38, Zech. 9:13 etc. (Exod. R. 15. 16); R. Aha (fourth century) on Jer. 40:1 and Ezek. 1:1 (Lam. R., Petihta 34).

51. E.g., Berekiah (fourth century) on Isa. 62:11 and Zech. 9:9 (Tanhuma ed. Buber III, 71).

interpretation, is not primarily to be found in the prophet's participation in God's pathos, but in his direct attachment to Israel, in whose fate God himself participates, even if it be necessary to punish the nation. The "merit of Israel," therefore, becomes a necessary prerequisite of prophetic gifts; the love of Israel, which is unconditional, becomes the source of the prophet's message. "You find everywhere that the prophets prophesy only because of the merit of Israel" (Mekilta on 12:1). R. Akiba (second century) states that, in all the thirty-eight years in which God's wrath was aroused against Israel, he did not speak with Moses. To which R. Simeon b. Azzai, Akiba's contemporary, adds: It was not with Moses alone that God spoke only for the sake of the merit of Israel, but with all the other prophets as well (for instance, Ezekiel, Jeremiah, and Baruch) he spoke only because of the merit of Israel (*ibid*). R. Judah b. Simon (fourth century), in discussing the initiation of Isaiah, has God take the side of Israel: My children are stubborn and troublesome; do you take upon yourself to be beaten and insulted by them? Isaiah accepts this condition, quoting 50:6 and adds: "I am not worthy to be sent by you to your children" (Pesikta ed. Buber 125b; Lev. R. 10.2).

The prophet's foremost task, according to the rabbis, is not to express God's condemnation of the sin of Israel or to proclaim the divine judgment; instead it is his duty to fight to the utmost for Israel and to advocate the cause of Israel before God, whenever his judgment is imminent. This, also a biblical motive, is emphasized in the Talmudic interpretation. Citing the example of Moses, David, and Jonah, R. Jonathan (second century) maintains; Everywhere you find that the patriarchs and the prophets gave their life for Israel (Mekilta on 12:1). They suffer whenever Israel suffers, says R. Jose b. Halafta (second century), commenting on Ezek. 4:9 (Pesikta ed. Buber 71b). According to R. Simeon b. Pazzi (third century), Isaiah was given "the tongue of the learned" (50:4)—to be the advocate of Israel (Pesikta Rabb. ed. Friedmann 151a). Jeremiah curses the day of his birth (20:14) because he is ordered to bring the cup of God's fury (25:15) to be drunk by Jerusalem (*ibid.* 129af). R. Levi (third century) has the prophet record every good deed that a man did (Lev. R. 34.9). The prophet prays for Israel. Jeremiah and Ezekiel are presented by R. Nehemiah (second century) as having prayed before God that he should not destroy the Temple (Ruth R. 2.2). In the relation between God and Israel, it is the prophet who in a

time of crisis pleads with God for Israel's sake, because, in spite of sin, "all that see them must acknowledge them, that they are the seed which the Lord hath blessed" (Isa. 61:9; Ex. R. 46.4).

Guided by this conception of Israel, the rabbis considered a prophet's criticism of Israel as inconsistent with his office. Whenever a prophet reproaches Israel, it is God who takes the side of the nation. He "does not like one who speaks evil of Israel" (Cant. R. 1.39). This motive appears in many versions in the Talmudic prophetology. "Slander not a servant unto his master (Prov. 30:10) is interpreted by R. Simeon b. Pazzi (third century) as admonition to the prophets not to denounce Israel before God. Moses is punished for having said, "Hear now ye rebels" (Num. 20:10); Elijah is rebuked by God for having said: "The children of Israel have forsaken Thy covenant" (I. Kings 19:10; Cant. R. 1.39). Hosea is, in Talmudic interpretation, reprimanded by God for his failure to reject God's own words: "Your children have sinned," and for his suggestion to exchange the sinful Israel for another nation. The prophet's marriages are not considered by the rabbis as symbols of Israel's faithlessness and rebellion, but as a divine means of educating the prophet toward a deeper attachment to Israel (Pesahim 87a). Isaiah is permitted to state that he is "a man of unclean lips" (6:5), but he suffers punishment for calling Israel "a people of unclean lips" (Cant. R. 1.39).[52] Jeremiah is understood by the rabbis to have reproached God for refusing to pardon Israel's sin (Lam. 3:42), whereupon his prophetic capacity was doubled (Jer. 36:32; Mekilta on 12:1).

If a prophet is found censuring Israel, other prophets, in the Talmudic exegesis, are sent to cancel or restrict that sentence. According to R. Jose b. Hanina (third century), Moses pronounced four sentences on Israel; but four other prophets (Amos, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Isaiah) came and revoked them (Makkot 24a). Of the four expressions used by Jeremiah to chastise Israel, one was repealed by Jeremiah himself and others by Moses and Isaiah (R. Joshua b. Levi, third century, and R. Joshua b. Abin, fourth century, Lam. R. 5.20). This motive sometimes appears in the form of a question put before God asking why he allowed the prophet to reprimand Israel. When God said to Ezekiel: Say to Israel: Thy father was an Amorite and thy mother was a Hittite (16:3),

52. In these interpretations only the general motivation is important and not the reference to a particular prophet. In other discussions, the same prophet, especially Moses, might be praised for his readiness to fight for Israel. E.g. Pesahim 87b.

the "arguing spirit" asked God: If Abraham and Sarah would appear before you, would you insult them thus? (R. Dimi, fourth century, Sanhedrin 44b).

Prophetic sentences which contain a criticism of Israel, are given by the Talmud an interpretation which limits the scope of the blame, or abolishes it altogether; at times the rabbis even turn the sentence into a testimony of Israel's virtue. By way of exegesis, such sentences are taken to support rabbinic teachings. To Amos' "Are ye not unto Me as the children of the Ethiopians" (9:7) we find the remark: When Israel sins, God calls them Ethiopians (Midr. Ps. on 7:1). Similarly: "As the children of the Ethiopians" you might consider yourself, but "you are unto Me"—children of Israel (Cant. R. 1:35). Or: As the Ethiopian differs by his skin, so Israel differs from all other nations by their deeds (Moed Katan 16b).[53] Hosea's "Ye are not My people and I will not be yours" (1:9) is understood by R. Hanina b. Hama (third century): Even if you want to separate yourself from me, I shall not share your opinion, but against your will you shall be my nation (Num. R. 2.16).[54] Isaiah's "Children that deal corruptly" (1:4) implies, according to R. Meir (second century), that though they deal corruptly, they are called "children" (Sifre Deut. 308).[55] Micah's utterance that God will pardon the iniquity "of the remnant of his heritage" (7:18) leads R. Aha b. Hanina (third century) to the question: Only to the remnant and not to the whole heritage? His answer, based on an exegesis of the word "remnant," eliminates the restriction implied by the prophet (Rosh ha-Shanah 17af).

Like their utterances, so the actions of the prophets, according to the Talmud, were motivated by the task of upholding the honor of Israel. Thus Jonah's reason for going to Tarshish was not "a flight from the presence of the Lord" but an attempt to help Israel. Had he gone to Nineveh and had its people repented, Israel's iniquities would have become visible by comparison with Nineveh, and Jonah would have been the "cause of Israel to be condemned." He therefore fled "outside of the land, where the Shekinah does not reveal itself." According to R. Nathan (second century), "Jonah made his voyage only in order to drown him-

53. Cf. Sifre Num. 99. Yalkut Shimeoni on Num. 12:1.

54. Similarly is interpreted Ezek. 20:32.

55. Similarly is interpreted Jer. 4:22 and Ezek. 33:31. Cf. Kiddushin 36a and the opposing view of R. Judah.

self in the sea." His story is taken as a proof that the "patriarchs and prophets gave their lives in behalf of Israel" (Mekilta on 12:1).

The prophetic thought of Israel as being forever confronted by the will and the might of God is retained in the Talmud. According to the rabbis, however, Israel's existence is not challenged by God. The theme of "eternal Israel" and of the divine love for Israel, used as a motive in the Talmudic interpretation of the prophets, implies to a large extent the polemic answer to the assertion of the Church that God has forsaken Israel and chosen a New Israel. The prophets, upon whom the Church has based its assertion, have been presented by the rabbis, especially in the third century, as spokesmen of the idea that the love of God is unconditional. In the Talmudic prophetology, the recognition of this fact becomes the very foundation of the prophetic mission.

VII

CONCLUSION

For this pre-systematic period of Jewish thought no attempt can be made to synthesize the diversified statements on the subject. It can only be maintained that many of the Talmudic sayings and interpretations concerning prophecy show a polemic and apologetic attitude towards certain movements, both within and without the Jewish realm, that brought about a revival of prophecy based on the authority of biblical prophecy as well as on a free and sometimes forced interpretation of the prophetic writings. The decisive challenge, however, arose from the propaganda of the early Church and its recognition of the central position of prophecy; its understanding of Jesus as the culmination of prophecy; its conception that prophecy was suspended in Israel, that the prophetic writings imply the abolishment of the Law, that the Law had to be understood prophetically, and that the prophets endorsed the rejection of Israel and the choice of a New Israel.

The Talmudic doctrine retained the idea of revelation (as a general, universal phenomenon in Israel), and many of the prophetic teachings, pointing at the same time to certain limitations in the prophetic activity and to certain shortcomings in the prophetic personality. While maintaining that there were forms under which the holy spirit was still active after the cessation of Scriptural prophecy, the rabbis asserted that the resting of the spirit upon man was the result of the study and

observance of the Law. The center of all prophecy was understood to be the revelation on Sinai, which had anticipated all future manifestations of the spirit. The prophets are presented as teachers of the Sinaitic Law. The abstract and theoretical postulates of the prophets are interpreted from the point of view of the Law. The prophetic activity is recorded as dependent upon the "merit of Israel," and the prophets are criticised for pronouncements opposing Israel.

These motives are indicative of an attempt to eliminate or at least to restrict the revolutionary, radical, and charismatic elements in prophecy, and thus to counteract the validity of the very basis of the opposing views. Polemics, therefore, increased the critical attitudes of the rabbis towards the phenomenon of prophecy as such. The transformation of the biblical prophet into a teacher and interpreter of the Law becomes a decisive characteristic of Talmudic prophetology.

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH AND THE UNITED STATES

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THE MERE FACT that a few Orthodox priests have been commissioned as chaplains of the United States Army and Navy in the present war shows to what an extent the Orthodox Church has been acclimated in the United States. These young men were able to pass the standards of education, secular and theological, required by the American government for the chaplains' service, and they are already making excellent records. It is surely to be hoped that they are but the forerunners of many more, for they have shown their value, and the large number of Orthodox in the United States renders it necessary that they should do their part in the general American life.

Yet the future of the Orthodox Church in the United States is by no means settled; for in a curious way it is confronted with a situation very similar to that which American missionaries have encountered in various countries of Europe and Asia. There is a rising tide of feeling in many lands against that sort of missionary endeavor which in the past has rested upon the political or quasi-political support of some foreign government. There has been a growing demand that the administration of churches be left in the hands of citizens of the country where the work is being carried on, and, as a result, there have been formed in many parts of the world native churches in which foreign assistance is welcomed, but in which it is no longer decisive or controlling. The experiences of the Christian missionaries in China in the last years are a good example of this tendency, for much of the Christian work since the outbreak of the war has been carried on by the Chinese clergy trained under Western leadership, who have assumed positions of responsibility.

In the past the position of the Orthodox Church in America has been strikingly analogous to this, with the single and important exception that its work has been largely confined to immigrants from Orthodox countries and that it has, therefore, lived a life apart, so far as possible, from the American religious world. Its enemies have been far more aware of this than its friends, or than it has been itself. The Russian

Orthodox mission in America during the First World War was bitterly attacked by the Germans for this reason. Many of the Orthodox themselves who have succeeded in American life have shown a tendency to drift away to other American churches, and while they have often alleged reasons of a social or material nature, we cannot doubt that it has been a result of the very situation to which we refer.

The answer would be and should be the organization of an American Orthodox Church in which the majority of the bishops would be familiar with the English language, educated in American schools and colleges, and sooner or later receiving their theological education in Orthodox seminaries in the United States on an intellectual level with the better American seminaries of other faiths, and with those of the Orthodox in their native lands. Furthermore, the majority of the services should be in the English language, for experience has shown that the average young man and woman of the second or third generation rarely understands the language of their immigrant ancestors, and if church services in an alien tongue still attracts them, it is rather for sentimental and emotional reasons than for intellectual understanding. This is in sharp contrast to the traditions of the Orthodox Church, which for centuries has sought to appeal to its members by giving them the services and the Bible in their native tongues.

It is not too much to say that, amid the clash of the Second World War, the Orthodox in America have a supreme opportunity for that action which will once and for all assure them a worthy and dignified place in American life, and give them the possibility of taking that place in the development of American religious thought to which they are richly entitled. Yet that same moment, if it is carelessly allowed to slip, may throw back the cause of Orthodoxy in America for centuries perhaps, and certainly for decades. The choice rests upon the leaders, clerical and lay, as to whether they will go along the path of the present and the future or will fall back into a past which gave them little then and will offer still less in the future.

In considering the position of the Orthodox in the United States, we must remember that, with the exception of the Russian Orthodox of Alaska who came to that area under the jurisdiction of the Tsars, the bulk of the members have emigrated on their own responsibility. Most of them came to a strange land to seek their fortune, and in the beginning many of them hoped to return home wealthy and spend the end of

their days in their native villages. It was only as they lost hope of this and settled down as a vital part of American life that they realized the need of establishing churches and other institutions of their own.

The clergy came to them from two sources. On the one hand, the authorities of the Churches at home realized the problem and sent out priests and bishops to meet the need. In the beginning, these men were supported by their home Churches like the average American missionary in a foreign field, but the sums spent in the United States could never be compared with those that Americans have sent abroad. Self-help and self-support early became an important feature of the Orthodox work. The second source of priests were men who, like their parishioners, came to the United States on their own initiative and, in defiance of strict canonical laws, commenced services wherever they could find a congregation willing to support them. It is easy to see that many of these men were perhaps poor representatives of their Faith but it was by no means the rule that they were inferior in intelligence or morals to those who came under orders.

The result was a curious development of congregationalism in the Church. The committees of laymen who, in many cases, formed the incorporating bodies, claimed full control of the temporalties of the parish and were often able to assert their claims and to appoint or discharge priests as it suited their fancy. Even among the Russians, where the Imperial Russian Ambassador and the Archbishop of the Aleutian Islands and North America were formed into a corporation to hold the church property, there were still many parishes which refused to obey.

There were a few young men trained for the priesthood more or less privately in the United States, but most candidates went to universities and seminaries in Europe for their theological education and were ordained there. The larger part of the newer priests were European born and trained, and came to the United States with little or no knowledge of American traditions or the English language. In effect they kept the Church alien and steadily lost their influence on a large part of the more alert younger generation.

With the stoppage of mass immigration into the United States, there came of necessity a great change. The Orthodox Church could no longer increase its membership by new arrivals, and it was forced to face the fact that it would diminish in numbers if it did not adapt itself to American life. In addition to that, the difficulties caused by the Russian

Revolution and the loss of Orthodox influence in Soviet government circles caused the Russians to consider seriously their new position, and the result was the rise of a practically autonomous body, first under Archbishop Platon, and then under Archbishop Theophilus.

In the same way, Archbishop Athenagoras, of the Greek Orthodox Church, was able to draw together, by infinite tact, most of the Greek congregations, but there too the invasion of Greece broke the uninterrupted flow of candidates for the priesthood to Athens and forced again the consideration of the training of priests in the United States. The same was true of the lesser Slavonic Orthodox Churches. The Bulgarian Bishop, who had arrived in the country only shortly before, returned home with the representatives of the Bulgarian government after Pearl Harbor, and the Yugoslav Bishop was isolated from his native land.

Thus, for one reason or another, the Orthodox in the United States have been separated from their home Churches. They have been forced to rely upon their congregations here for their support and to face the problem of self-education and self-development. This has been a heavy burden, for among all the priests and laymen in this country there were very few who had been trained for educational and intellectual leadership in their own lands. They were usually selected for practical skill in administration and for pastoral work, and were appalled at the magnitude of the problems confronting them when relations with home were unavoidably broken.

Under these circumstances, it has been inevitable that the Orthodox have continued to maintain their national identities. The Greek and the Russian parishes have rarely if ever co-operated. The lesser Slav Churches have tended to join with the Russians, where they could not have parishes of their own. The Ukrainian Orthodox, with their hierarchy not accepted by the Russians, have followed along with the Greeks. The bishops have met together occasionally for joint consultation, but it has been very difficult for them to take any decisive action towards unity, lest they run counter to the congregational tendencies of their parishes and create new feuds.

Any unprejudiced observer must pay tribute to the progress which the Orthodox have made during this period. St. Vladimir's Seminary has trained the young priests who have become chaplains in the American Service. The leaders have measured up to their tasks, and with every year they have become better identified with American life. Only on the

one point of unification of the various Orthodox groups has there been hesitation, and this no thoughtful observer had a right to expect to be otherwise.

What of the future? There lies the crux of the problem. It appeared first with the re-establishment of the Patriarchate of Moscow with the permission of the Soviet government. The autonomous Russian Church in America included the name of the Patriarch among the hierarchs for whom they prayed, but this did not of necessity remove in the mind of the Church authorities in the Soviet Union distrust of the settlement created by the Russian Orthodox in the United States. Rather, it encouraged certain parishes to appeal directly to Moscow and more or less openly separate themselves from the rest of the group. The disestablishment of the Churches in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and any changes in the setup in Greece will all have repercussions. Even now there have been withdrawn the tentative overtures of the Orthodox to join the Federal Council of Churches, and the approaching liberation of Europe will seriously menace the settlements that have so far been achieved.

There can be no doubt that the burden of the future rests equally upon the feeling of the Orthodox in the United States and the higher ecclesiastics in Europe. The Orthodox in America must, at the same time that they reopen relations with their home Churches, stand fast for the exercise of autonomy. For over a century the Episcopal and Presbyterian Churches have received scholars and clergy from the British Isles, have maintained good relations with those ecclesiastical bodies from which they have sprung, but have handled their own internal affairs. The Orthodox are barely in worse case than were these churches at the time of the American Revolution, when American independence was created and their members had the choice of acquiescing in the new order or emigrating to Canada. There is hardly an Orthodox group in America today which could not function canonically and with dignity and honor if it were permanently cut off from its original source.

Yet it would be of mutual advantage if the Orthodox Churches of Europe accepted the new situation and still continued a helping hand without interfering in internal management or endeavoring to be a court of last appeal. The Orthodox history of the last one hundred and fifty years with the recognition of the national Churches of the Balkans on the ruins of the old Ottoman Empire, and the changes that came into effect after the World War, shows abundant reason why clever canon-

ists can justify the changed situation without breaking the letter or the spirit of Orthodox tradition.

There is only one point which will offer trouble—the new Orthodox groups in America, whether individually or collectively, will not be a state church, state-supported. This was not the case when the Church of Greece formally became autocephalous after the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece. It was not true in Yugoslavia, Romania, and Albania. It was not true in Bulgaria, but the claims of the Bulgarians to dioceses still within the Ottoman Empire served as an excuse for a formal excommunication by the Patriarch of Constantinople. It will be taken with bad grace by many Americans and by many Orthodox if this point is formally raised by Churches which are no longer state-supported themselves.

In the same way, canons could be brought forward to prove that there can be only one Orthodox Church in a country, and that, until full agreement is reached among the different groups, no Church at home can waive its complete control. But that is a narrow interpretation of the canons which completely ignores the entire history of Orthodox immigration into America, the spirit of American life, and the possibilities which the American way of life offers. For twenty years the Orthodox Churches of Europe have been endeavoring to arrange a council with complete representation of all the recognized Churches. No one knows how long it will take them to accomplish this. In the meantime, there is a situation in America which requires nothing more than a broad-minded point of view on the part of the individual Church authorities.

It is very possible that, if real freedom were given to these Churches in the United States, they might continue to function separately for some years. There can be no doubt that, once fear of the decision of the governing bodies of the Churches in Europe were removed, once there were a certainty that there would be no open or clandestine attempt from Europe to overturn decisions arrived at in the United States, the chief cause of mutual jealousy and separation would be removed. The leaders of the Churches in the United States, with better opportunities to know one another and their parishes and problems (which are the same in all cases), would undoubtedly work out more satisfactory joint schemes for co-operation in their work, in ministering to scattered members of their flocks, and in the training of their clergy than has been

possible in the past. Daily the English language is becoming more truly the language of the people; the American schools and colleges are training the younger generation; service in the Army and Navy in the Second World War is bringing the young people together. It can be confidently predicted that, within a quarter of a century, the spirit of Orthodoxy will find a common means of expression among the members of all racial stocks in the English language, or it will cease to exist. The work may be retarded by the influence of the older generations, or by the zeal of converts from non-Orthodox religions who are thrilled by the exotic sounds of a strange tongue in the services and become super-nationalist in their feelings, but it cannot be postponed for long.

Nothing could be worse today for the Orthodox in the United States than for the church authorities to try to reduce them to a missionary and colonial status, to send over bishops and priests knowing nothing of America to teach the people European ideologies, to recall or discipline men who have found their place in the United States for ostensibly religious reasons but really on political grounds. It would react badly upon a large part of the Church members and would convince them that the Church could not become American. It would have the same effect upon the great body of the American people and lead to a well-founded suspicion that there was something in Orthodoxy that could not be American. It would destroy a half a century and more of serious and earnest work by devout bishops and priests to help their people maintain the Christian faith and virtues during the hard period of readjustment to another mode of social, political, and economic life.

The Orthodox can still be helped by the Churches of their homelands. They can still be aided by scholars and clergy from abroad, but their history is too fine, too American, to be scorned and discounted abroad by men who know nothing of America and its development. They are winning approval here, and it is no time to reopen ancient feuds, to give a twisted explanation of canons devised for another purpose and situation, to disrupt what is being done. Now that the war in Europe has ended, the crucial moment is at hand. The Orthodox will remain in America and flourish here, but their work will be immeasurably aided if the ecclesiastics abroad give up hopes of domination, and content themselves with giving honest aid and assistance to their co-religionists in America, allowing them to solve all their problems within the joint confines of the Orthodox faith and the American spirit.

EITHER/OR: A REVIEW ARTICLE*

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I

NO ONE CAN understand Kierkegaard's works without having a knowledge of his biography.[1] This remark applies especially to *Either/Or,* his first important book, which has appeared in English translation just a century after it was published in Danish. The delay has not been entirely fruitless, for we are now able to understand the author's purpose more adequately than his contemporaries could. *Either/Or* belongs with *Fear and Trembling* and *Repetition*[2] as written "for Regina"; and these three, together with *Stages on Life's Way,* comprise his "aesthetic" writings.

The entire work of almost seven hundred pages was composed "lock, stock and barrel"[3] in eleven months during and after his engagement with Regina Olsen. Volume II contains two long letters: the first, on the "Aesthetic Validity of Marriage," was written—pathetically enough—during the days when he was coming to the painful conclusion that the engagement would have to be broken; the second letter was written during the winter of 1841-42, in Berlin, where he was attending Schelling's lectures in hopes of forgetting Regina and seeing Hegel demolished. Volume I was completed after he had returned to Copenhagen in March 1842. Certain defects in *Either/Or* may be understood if it is remembered that he was also writing his master's thesis on *The Concept of Irony* during the engagement, and attending three or four lectures daily during his stay in Berlin.

The book begins with a circumstantial account by its pseudonymous editor, Victor Eremita, of how he had bought a writing desk, after having long been fascinated by it in a shop window. One day he was hastily trying to get some money out of it, while a carriage awaited to take him

* *Either/Or,* By SOREN KIERKEGAARD. Two Volumes. Vol. I, translated by DAVID F. and LILLIAN M. SWENSON, vii + 387 pp. Vol. II, translated by WALTER LOWRIE, xvi + 304 pp. Princeton University Press, 1944. Set, $7.50.

1. See Dr. Walter Lowrie's *Kierkegaard* or his *A Short Life of Kierkegaard.*
2. Cf. *The Review of Religion,* March 1943, pp. 300 ff.
3. *The Journals of Kierkegaard,* translated by Alexander Dru. Entry 586.

for an outing in the country, but the drawer refused to open; whereupon, in his rage, he struck it with a hatchet, and a secret drawer sprang open, in which he found two sets of papers. The first consisted of a series of aesthetic and literary studies by a young man whom the editor labels "A"; the second contained two very long letters (and an "ultimatum") sent to "A" by a certain Judge William, whom the editor labels "B." The major purpose of the book is to present a sharp alternative between two ways of life—the aesthetic and the ethical—as represented by A and B. As Victor Eremita says, these papers disclose the contradictions between the external and the internal in the lives of two men: cultivated brilliance covering despair, and moralistic prosiness covering a deep, firm spirituality.

Of course both A and B are Kierkegaard (to a large extent), and "Victor Eremita" throws out a broad hint when he says that he selected the title by looking upon both sets of papers as the work of one man.[4] However, Kierkegaard's contemporaries could hardly be expected to realize that Volume I characterizes a phase he went through as a student at the University, when he renounced Christianity and sought a life indifferent to ethical distinctions. During this period he was especially interested in the legends of Faust, Don Juan, and Ahsverus; he came to regard these figures as symbolic of three aspects of life outside Christianity: doubt, sensuality, and despair; and the first two occupy an important place in Volume I. The arguments of Judge William are those which Kierkegaard used against himself; indeed, one of the most valuable features of the book is that "B's" penetrating descriptions of "A's" state of mind provide us with detailed information concerning early student days before S.K. kept a Journal. By the time he had completed *Either/Or,* the ethical had so far triumphed that he was already pressing into the third stage—the religious. Hence, even though Victor Eremita declares that one never knows whether "B" succeeded in convincing "A," or vice versa, the author's real intention is to expose the perils of "A's" point of view and to force a decision against it. The pseudonym stands for the fact that his lonely (Eremite) path has led to victory.

Other interests are also involved, however. Kierkegaard desired to perform a "good deed" in making clear to Regina why the engagement

4. Cf. I, 11.

had to be broken, and perhaps enabling her, especially through repulsion at "The Diary of the Seducer," to become completely free of him. Ironically, this proved to be quite unnecessary, since Regina recovered from the blow sufficiently to marry Fritz Schlegel. Obviously no reviewer could possibly know about all this at the time; it is only by reading Kierkegaard's own comments on *Either/Or*[5] that we can know it today. Yet he was furious at the reading public of Copenhagen for being intrigued with portions which he meant to be offensive; and he was especially furious with Professor Heiberg for writing a review which failed to grasp the real intention of the book; for example, Heiberg comments unfavorably upon the multiplicity of themes in Volume I, whereas S.K. was deliberately attempting to illustrate thereby the lack of a unifying principle in the aesthetic stage. The fury was unjustified. Even today, a reviewer finds his complicated, pseudonymous methods irksome. How is it possible to explain to the uninitiated that, in the case of "The Diary of the Seducer," we have four Chinese puzzle-boxes, one inside the other? A edits the Diary, Victor Eremita edits A, and Kierkegaard really contains them all. With good reason Judge William warns against becoming "like those unhappy demoniacs, a legion."[6] But of course S. K. was not writing for reviewers, and he did manage finally, through suffering and despair, to reach integration and directness. *Either/Or* helps to show why he had such a hard time of it.

Still a third motive underlies the book, but it can be understood more easily. After first being attracted, Kierkegaard had become highly critical of Hegel, and in *Either/Or* one hears the opening shot of an attack against speculation which he kept up throughout the rest of his career. His primary objection against the Hegelian system was that it could make no genuine provision for ethical decision; he regarded it as a great achievement in formal logic, which became ludicrous as soon as one attempted to employ it in making the transition to existence. Thus *Either/Or,* as a title, stands for facing the contradictions of life and meeting them by decision, instead of "mediating" them (i.e., reaching a synthesis) by speculation in a system which leaves no room for contradictions. As we have seen, S. K. hoped to find a refutation of Hegel in

5. Cf. *Postscript,* pp. 225 ff., *The Point of View,* Part One, and the *Journals,* especially entries 467-73.

6. II, 135.

Schelling's lectures,[7] but having been disappointed on this score ("Schelling drivels inordinately"), he set about the task for himself. It must be understood that when Judge William criticizes "philosophy," he is referring almost exclusively to Hegelianism. Moreover, the Diapsalm entitled "*Either/Or*. An ecstatic lecture,"[8]—ascribed, of course, to "A"—is a playful satire on Hegelian dialectic:

> If you marry, you will regret it; if you do not marry, you will also regret it; if you marry or do not marry, you will regret both . . . . (And so on, with laughing or weeping over the world's follies, believing or not believing a woman, hanging yourself or not hanging yourself) . . . . This, gentlemen, is the sum and substance of all philosophy. It is not only at certain moments that I view everything *aeterno modo*, as Spinoza says, but I live constantly *aeterno modo*. There are many who think that they live thus, because after having done the one or the other, they combine or mediate the opposites. But this is a misunderstanding . . . . My philosophy is at least easy to understand, for I have only one principle, and I do not even proceed from that . . . . If it seems, therefore, to one or another of my respected hearers that there is anything in what I say, it only proves that he has no talent for philosophy . . . . Experience has shown that it is by no mean difficult for philosophy to begin. Far from it. It begins with nothing, and consequently can always begin. But the difficulty, both for philosophy and for philosophers, is to stop . . . .

Underlying this raillery is Kierkegaard's conviction that the speculative philosopher, with his "objectivity," never knows how to "knot the end of the thread" so that his thinking can catch hold in the fabric of existence. This conviction explains why Judge William stresses the individual, against the Hegelian absolute, and why S.K. took the individual as "his" category. Indeed, it explains the opening words of *Either/Or*:

> Dear Reader: I wonder if you may not sometimes have felt inclined to doubt a little the correctness of the familiar philosophic (i.e., Hegelian) maxim that the external is the internal, and the internal the external.[9]

Kierkegaard mentions a fourth motive for writing the book, a motive which he did not fully comprehend until later, when he came to see how the various experiences and stages of his life fit together into a pattern

7. Bakunin and Engels attended the same lectures, and were also disappointed. Cf. Erich Frank: *Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth*, p. 168.

8. I, 30 ff.

9. I, 3. Parenthesis mine.

that revealed the over-ruling hand of "divine Governance." The poetical within him had to be fully expressed ("evacuated") before he could get rid of it. Hence, even his extravagant, though sincere, eulogy of Mozart in Volume I serves a religiously dominated purpose—undiscerned at the time. And, hence, all of the volumes of the aesthetic period bear pseudonyms, because they are not direct expressions of the author's standpoint; while from the first, the edifying discourses, which do express a religious purpose, bear Kierkegaard's own name.

II

Now what about the contents of Volume I? Dr. Lowrie has declared that "the attempt to give one who has never read it a conception of the content and character of *Either/Or* would be not only presumptuous but silly."[10] I agree with him entirely. Therefore, as in my two previous reviews of Kierkegaard,[11] I shall try to provide a convenient guide for those who *have* read the book. Almost invariably, S.K. must be read at least twice, first to find out what he is going to say, and then to find out what he is saying. I hope that this review may expedite the second reading. To those who have not read him, I can only address a sincere plea that they shall not allow these pages to prevent them from doing so.

Volume I begins with a series of aphorisms, parables, and lyrical observations called "Diapsalmata." Since the first is one of the most revealing paragraphs S.K. ever wrote, I shall quote it in full:

> What is a poet? A poet is an unhappy being whose heart is torn by secret sufferings, but whose lips are so strangely formed that when the sighs and cries escape them, the sound is like beautiful music. His fate is like that of the unfortunate victims whom the tyrant Phalaris imprisoned in a brazen bull, and slowly tortured over a steady fire; their cries could not reach the tyrant's ears so as to strike terror into his heart; when they reached his ears they sounded like sweet music. And men crowd about the poet and say to him: "Sing for us soon again"; that is as much as to say: "May new sufferings torment your soul, but may your lips be formed as before; for the cries would only frighten us, but the music is delicious." And the critics come, too, and say: "Quite correct, and so it ought to be, according to the rules of aesthetics." Now it is understood that a critic resembles a poet to a hair; he only lacks the suffering in his heart, and the music upon his lips. Lo, therefore I would rather be a swineherd from Amager, and be understood by the swine, than be a poet and be misunderstood by men.[12]

10. *Kierkegaard*, p. 237.
11. *The Review of Religion*, Jan., 1943, pp. 143-62; March, 1943, pp. 300-17.
12. I, 15.

Kierkegaard himself declares[13] that this furnishes the theme of the whole book; the last Diapsalm shows how a poetic existence finds satisfaction only in having the laugh on its side. But the problem which thus arises is not completely resolved until the last word of the sermon at the end of Volume II: "Only the truth which edifies is truth for you." What does he mean? He means that one can work his way through the aimless nihilism and despair which underlie the aesthetic stage only by an ethical decision whereby he concretely "chooses" himself, instead of maintaining a spectator attitude (either through a detached hedonism or through philosophical objectivity); in and through ethical seriousness, he will discover that his freedom is accompanied by a kind of spiritual dependence which leads beyond the ethical to religious faith. In other words, living ("existential") truth, as contrasted with propositional truth, can be discovered only by embodying it within action—though here the stress falls more on inward transformation than upon the overt behavior of which it is the precondition. "Only the truth which edifies is truth for you." Thus it was that Kierkegaard moved, in a few inwardly intense years, from the ironic-melancholy observations of the Diapsalmata to a deadly serious, yet essentially triumphant, dedication to Christ. In order to exhibit the mood of the Diapsalmata more adequately, let me quote once again:

> Old age realizes the dreams of youth: look at Dean Swift; in his youth he built an asylum for the insane, in his old age he was himself an inmate.
>
> I have the courage, I believe, to doubt everything; I have the courage, I believe, to fight with everything; but I have not the courage to know anything; not the courage to possess, to own anything. . . .
>
> Time flows, life is a stream, people say, and so on. I do not notice it. Time stands still, and I with it. All the plans I make fly right back upon myself; when I would spit, I even spit into my own face.
>
> The result of my life is simply nothing, a mood, a single color. My result is like the painting of the artist who was to paint a picture of the Israelites crossing the Red Sea. To this end, he painted the whole wall red, explaining that the Israelites had already crossed over, and that the Egyptians were drowned.[14]

The first long essay in Volume I is called "The Immediate Stages of the Erotic, or the Musical Erotic." In ecstatic terms "A" describes his fascination with Mozart, especially the music for *Don Juan,* and ex-

13. *Journals,* entry 469.
14. I, 16, 18, 20, 22.

plains why he regards it as unrivalled. Here a great talent is perfectly joined with a great subject, and an abstract subject (sensual genius) has been expressed through the most abstract medium, music. Don Juan provides a perfect theme for musical treatment, since he incarnates the opposite of "spirit." In order to understand this last statement, one must first accept "A's" thesis that Christianity brought sensuality into the world by the opposition which formed the latter into a conscious principle. (Somewhat after the fashion in which St. Paul declares that the law brought sin into the world. Romans 7:7). In paganism the sensuous reflected harmony, not conflict; *Eros* was not a principle, since the god of love was not "in love" himself, and therefore did not possess what he bestowed. It was not until the Incarnation, where Christ possesses what He bestows *(Agape)*, that the opposite *(Eros)* could become a principle, incarnate in an individual as erotic genius, and expressible in its immediacy only through music.[15] Language is in a sense superior to music, because it is reflective, but both are "spiritually determined"—i.e., both have meaning instead of being mere sounds. Hence, when the immediate, though spiritually determined, is such that it falls outside the realm of spirit, then music has found its absolute subject; this is sensuous immediacy.

Three gradations may be discerned in reaching or constituting this sensuous immediacy. The first is "dreaming"—a melancholy prior to the awakening of desire, before the subject and object have become separate; this is suggested by the Page in *Figaro*. The second is "seeking"; the dream is over; desire awakens, separate from its object, and seeks reunion; but the object is manifold. This is suggested by Papageno in *The Magic Flute*. The third is desire, absolutely determined as that which spirit excludes; this is incarnate in *Don Juan*.

In the Middle Ages the dialectic of life was often illustrated by contrasting pairs; e.g., Faust vs. Wagner, Don Quixote vs. Sancho Panza. Don Juan must be thought of in terms of the conflict between flesh and spirit which Christianity brought into the world. He is the "sarkical" principle concentrated in an individual,—the sensual-demonic, while Faust is the intellectual-demonic. But Don Juan received inferior treatment until it was discerned that music is the proper medium. In music

15. One has the right to be surprised that "A," the aesthete, is such a discerning theologian. For a recent discussion of the same theme, see Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros*.

he becomes the principle of seduction, where sensual love is faithless and pays no attention to the individuality of the object. Music can express sensual love for "woman" in the abstract because it *is* abstract, and yet immediate. Don Juan is not reflective; his seductive power, the exuberant joy of life, goes on and on, without calculation, directed toward "woman" in general, and therefore awakening and transfiguring every woman, regardless of age. This must be heard; it cannot be thought. Hence if Don Juan is to be expressed in words (as by Molière and Byron), he should be made reflective,—one who concentrates on cleverness of seduction instead of direct satisfaction of desire. In the opera, Don Juan is not a character, but essentially "life"; and the other participants, instead of having a validity of their own, as in a drama, are essentially passions which receive their animating force from Don Juan; they are like planets, illuminated only on the side turned toward the sun. The overture, by being composed last, grasps this unifying mood.

Yet even "A" partly discerns the Nemesis which accompanies what Don Juan expresses:

> Don Juan's life is not despair; but it is the whole power of sensuality, which is born in dread, and Don Juan himself is this dread, but this dread is precisely the demoniac joy of life. . . . When one skims a stone over the surface of the water, it skips lightly for a time, but as soon as it ceases to skip, it instantly sinks down into the depths; so Don Juan dances over the abyss, jubilant in his brief respite.[16]

The next essay is entitled "The Ancient Tragical Motive as Reflected in the Modern. An Essay in the Fragmentary, Read before a Meeting of the *Symparanekromenoi*."[17] It affords a striking instance of how Kierkegaard arrived at universal principles by means of relating everything to his own personal situation instead of by abstracting from it. Here "A" is concerned to discover what ancient and modern tragedy have in common, and how they differ. The chief contrast is between consciousness of racial solidarity and consciousness of individual, isolated responsibility. An element of fatalism enters into Greek tragedy where the life of the individual "rests" in the state, the family, and destiny; guilt is ambiguous because the hero is intermediate between activity and passivity. But

16. I, 105.

17. A group of "A's" friends. "The fellowship of buried lives" is how Geismar translates the name of the society.

the modern view is "Pelagian"; the hero stands or falls on his own acts either as innocent or as wholly responsible; this view really loses the tragic dimension, for the individual's ridiculous attempt to be the Absolute is comical.

The modern age has also lost the religious dimension, which offers the peace of continuity on the other side of ethical tension, whereas the aesthetic offers continuity prior to such tension. Religion's intense sense of individual responsibility goes beyond Pelagian moralism, and its recognition of collective human sin goes beyond aesthetic continuity.

I am surprised to find this concise summary of the "three stages" attributed to "A," since he is represented thoughout the second volume as being blind to the significance of the ethical and religious, while here his remarks contain a trenchant indictment of humanism. Indeed, those psychoanalysts who are not hopelessly enslaved to anti-religious compulsions may discern in them the interesting suggestion that much basic anxiety springs from an attempt to live solely upon one's own responsibility. So far from being healthy autonomy, this may be as much a neurotic attempt to "play God" as are certain familiar forms of religious delusion.

"A" goes on to complain—introducing another theme which often recurs in S. K.'s writings—that in our age everything is "mixed up": the theatre is edifying, novels convert, and the church waxes philosophical or aesthetically sentimental. In Greek tragedy the sorrow, compassion, and guilt move at a consistently pre-ethical level; but modern tragedy incongruously introduces an ethical category—remorse; and it makes genuine compassion impossible, since if the tragedy is the individual's own fault he should handle it himself. These reflections have a personal importance for Kierkegaard, because his father's guilty secret and his own morbidity involved him in a situation of inherited guilt and family fatality; and the fact that "the modern age" could not comprehend such a situation deepened his sense of isolation. No wonder there were times when he felt as though he alone understood original sin and Christian salvation. In this essay, however, his remarks about Christ reflect either an early phase in Kierkegaard's own thinking, or a deliberate attempt to make "A's" theology loose-jointed; for he declares that since the case of Christ goes beyond aesthetic-tragic categories, it belongs—of all things—to metaphysics.[18]

18. I, 122.

At the end of the essay, "A" imaginatively reformulates the situation of Antigone, in order to show how a theme can be at once modern and tragic, provided the mixed up categories get unscrambled. Throughout, Antigone is S. K. himself. In "A's" *Oedipus* everyone remains outwardly happy; only Antigone knows the truth, and she suffers *anxiety*. This is the category of modern tragedy, which differs from "sorrow" (ancient tragedy) because it involves reflection. The reflectiveness of this modern Antigone is shown in the fact that she resolves to keep her pain a secret. Here family guilt, instead of being an external fact, is turned inward. Antigone is in love, but she cannot marry without telling the secret, and she cannot tell it without betrayal. The importuning of her lover increases her pain, but by giving him up she breaks the curse which would have been transmitted to succeeding generations. Those who know Kierkegaard's biography will immediately see in this a parable for his relationship to his father's secret and to Regina; "A" even puts words into the mouth of Antigone's lover which Regina had used—about not being able to live if the love must be relinquished. Whether this introduction of existential, personal concern vitiates the essay as literary criticism, the reader must "judge for himself."

The next study is called "Shadowgraphs"[19] because it depicts reflective grief indirectly by projecting the shadows which it casts, so that by sympathy it may be possible to penetrate behind appearances to the hidden reality. Joy, and even "immediate" grief (like that felt at the death of a lover), can be represented directly; but art cannot catch internalized grief, which is like a prisoner in a subterranean cell who walks ceaselessly to and fro. "A" tries to suggest the latter through three instances, all of which have to do with unhappy love where sorrow is rooted to deceit. Actually, each instance is adapted in such a way as to convey a message to Regina.

In the case of Marie Beaumarchais (from Goethe's *Clavigo*), doubt concerning whether her lover really was a deceiver gives "perpetual motion" to her grief. A deception is a paradox which love cannot think; and yet Marie is compelled to try to think it. By means of a determination of will she could break through this paradoxical reflection; but she remains within aesthetic categories and thinks she is going to die—even

19. With the subtitle: "Psychological Pastime. Lecture Delivered before the *Symparanekromenoi*."

though life does not exactly follow aesthetic norms and she does not die. She goes over the pros and cons of the paradox endlessly:

> It is conceivable that he might regret the step he has taken and return to her; or, and this would be still more glorious, perhaps he has no need of regretting it, perhaps he will be able to justify himself absolutely and explain everything.[20]
>
> He does not love human beings at all; he loves only ideas, thoughts. . . . Perhaps he even loves me still—aye, it was out of love for me that he left me. . . . What it was that tore him away from me I do not know; I do not understand this mysterious power. But it has given him pain, deep pain; he did not wish me to share his pain, and therefore he pretended to be a deceiver.[21]

The case of Donna Elvira in *Don Juan* is somewhat different, since she *knows* she has been deceived. "A" constructs an imaginary situation where this woman, who has sacrificed everything for Don Juan, encounters her lover. The greatness of her hatred makes her more fascinating than ever, makes her as strong as he is. Only two drastic courses are open to her: the cloister, where she deals with a dangerous power (the religious) that will not be mocked; or holding fast to Don Juan's love to save herself from despair. A third alternative, seeking comfort in the love of another, would be unthinkably terrible. One might observe, sardonically, that Regina chose the third; but then, Kierkegaard was hardly a Don Juan.

The last "shadowgraph" is Margaret, from Goethe's *Faust*. Faust turns to the sensual only after he has lost the world through doubt, and only in order to gain a momentary diversion from the nothingness of doubt. He has no desire to destroy Margaret's simplicity, since that is the source of his respite, but she places her faith in *him*, and that is fatal. He cannot carry her out of her "broken immediacy" into the regions of the spirit, since he is fleeing from them; the only alternative is to desire her sensually and abandon her. In a concluding reverie on these three "brides of sorrow," "A" asks,

> "Should we wish them a restoration of what they have lost; would that be gain for them? Have they not already received a higher consecration?" Let them be united. "Only he who has been bitten by a serpent knows the suffering of one who has been bitten by a serpent."[22]

20. I, 150, S.K. does this in *"Guilty?/Not Guilty?"* in the *Stages*.
21. I, 153 f.
22. I, 176.

An address on "The Unhappiest Man,"[23] which follows, is replete with anticipations of later Kierkegaardian themes. "A" tells of a grave in England, inscribed to "The Unhappiest Man," and surmises that each person feels it is meant for him. His first suggestion, however, is that not death, but inescapable life makes one unhappiest; happiest of all is he who never was born.[24] In an analysis prophetic of *Sickness unto Death,* the author shows how the unhappy person is one who has the content of his being outside himself.[25] This holds for those who live by memory or hope, especially if the one be turned nostalgically to an unreal past and the other to an impossible future, since there is no "time" in which the individual can really live. When these two factors are combined so that one hopes for what should be remembered and remembers that for which he ought to hope, the result is utter emptiness. Various approximations to this nadir are considered: a young woman whose lover has been faithless, Antigone, Job,[26] and the martyr type. But when "A" finally reaches a description of the "unhappiest man," he turns out to be one who appears to be happiest. Everyone envies him, admires him, and depends upon him, believing that he can make the world happy; but no one suspects his lonely pain and grief. Thus, once again, the contradiction between the external and the internal is exposed, "and what is life but madness, and faith but folly, and hope but the briefest respite, and love but vinegar in the wound."[27]

As I have already indicated, one cannot expect to grasp the full import of what is being said in a first reading of Kierkegaard. The pages we are surveying may seem to be a series of detached studies—as Heiberg took them to be—unless the opening words about the contradiction between the external and the internal are seen as providing a single theme for both volumes. As it happens, the next essay is an article about a comedy by Scribe, called *The First Love,* which Heiberg translated. In Volume II we shall find Judge William making serious observations on the relationship between first love and marriage. But in his article, "A" revels in the ludicrous situation which arises when two suitors, Rinville

23. "An Enthusiastic Address before the *Symparanekromenoi.*"

24. Thus echoing a famous Greek aphorism, first found in Theognis. Cf. W. C. Greene, *Moira,* p. 42.

25. Once again, "A" incongruously defends a point of view which is opposed to the aesthetic, and which Judge William advocates in Volume II.

26. Cf. *Repetition,* p. 132.

27. I, 188.

and Charles, trade identities, and the heroine, Emmeline, is so completely under the spell of a childhood love for Charles (her cousin) that she judges both men in terms of her phantasy instead of in terms of reality. The situation is doubly comical because the "reality" she is dealing with is itself befuddled. Concerning Emmeline's fixation, "A" wryly observes that people may love many times, while always claiming that each time is the "first love."

> When a widower and a widow join fortunes, and each one brings five children along, then they still assure each other on their wedding day that this love is their first love.[28]

"The Rotation Method—An Essay in the Theory of Social Prudence," displays the savage wit which helped make Kierkegaard both formidable and lonely. "A" lays down the thesis that boredom moves the world:

> The gods were bored, and so they created man. Adam was bored because he was alone, and so Eve was created . . . then Adam and Eve were bored together; then Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel were bored *en famille*; then the population of the world increased, and the peoples were bored *en masse*.[29]

Why not cure Denmark of boredom, he asks, by having the nation act like a man of genius who borrows money for a holiday and then forgets to pay his debts? When everyone has money, everything will be, in a certain sense, free, and no one will worry about property.

> Only in my own case would there be an exception. I reserve to myself securities in the Bank of London to the value of one hundred dollars a day, partly because I cannot do with less, partly because the idea is mine, and finally because I may not be able to hit upon a new idea when the fifteen millions (which Denmark is to borrow) are gone.[30]

Boredom cannot be cured by restless work; actually the two go together. Englishmen are busy, but they are also supremely bored. The proper remedy involves ingenuity in putting limitations on this "going round and round." Nothing shall be allowed to acquire significance which goes beyond being able to recollect it with tranquillity. People who are feverishly trying to drown out an unpleasant past overlook the

28. I, 208.
29. I, 235.
30. I, 235. Parenthesis mine.

fact that overwhelming pleasures can also disturb the memory with a sense of present privation. In order to avoid getting caught in a squirrel-cage rotation of friendship, marriage, or business, "A's" method requires something like the rotation of crops, constantly moving on from one thing to another. The secret lies in an arbitrariness that fits in with accidental happenings—an arbitrariness like objecting to a man because no word rhymes with his name.

This brings us to the "Diary of the Seducer," with which Volume I concludes. Knud Fick published a translation in 1935; but the Diary cannot be understood apart from the rest of the book. Dr. Lowrie says that the Seducer here and in "The Banquet," in *Stages*, was probably P. L. Møller, one of S. K.'s companions. The Diary glosses over the vulgarity and multiplicity of his affairs, because Kierkegaard still hoped for Møller's reformation. "But in the *Stages* the Seducer is plainly a lost soul."[31]

"A" is not the author of the Diary. He knows both Johannes, the Seducer, and his victim, Cordelia; and he has come into possession of both the Diary and some of their correspondence. But despite his own aesthetic nihilism, "A" is almost terrified by one whose poetic detachment has led him to make a sort of macabre game out of creating and destroying the love of a young girl. The seducer's concentration upon the inward *way* in which he reaches his goal might even be taken as an inversion of Kierkegaard's own concentration upon the inward *way* in which one reaches truth.

The outward details of the seduction can be quickly told, but that signifies nothing, since everything important lies in the reflections and psychological machinations of Johannes. He sees a beautiful girl and gradually makes her acquaintance while seeming quite aloof.

> The fact is enough to drive one to despair, that it requires no art to seduce a girl, but that one is fortunate to find one worth seducing. . . . Most people who rush into (love) become engaged or commit some other foolishness, and in the twist of a wrist it is all over, and they neither know what they have gained nor what they have lost.[32]
>
> What enjoyment can there be in love if there is not the most absolute self-surrender, at least on one side?[33]

31. *Kierkegaard*, p. 118.
32. I, 277.
33. I, 277f.

A young girl who wishes to please by being interesting, usually succeeds only in pleasing herself.[34]

He helps a friend, Edward, to court her, while he goes along to the house on the pretext of diverting the attention of Cordelia's aunt.

We four together make a peculiar picture. If I wished to find an analogy in a familiar picture, I might think of myself as Mephistopheles; but the difficulty is, however, that Edward is no Faust. If I were to be Faust, there again arises the difficulty, that Edward is certainly no Mephistopheles. Neither am I a Mephistopheles, least of all in Edward's eyes. He regards me as the guardian angel of his love, and he is right in that, for at least he can be certain that no one watches more solicitously over his love than I.[35]

At the right moment he asks the aunt for Cordelia's hand and is accepted, despite the astonishment of the two ladies and Edward's rage.

Then he sets about awakening Cordelia's passion, while bringing her around to the notion that engagements are ludicrous.

A seducer . . . one can by no means call me. I am an aesthete . . . who . . . believes in love . . . and only makes the private reservation that no love affair should last more than six months at the most, and that every erotic relationship should cease as soon as one has had the ultimate enjoyment. . . . To poetize oneself into a young girl is an art, to poetize oneself out of her, is a masterpiece.[36]

In order to make Cordelia disgusted with being engaged, Johannes takes her to his uncle's house, where ten engaged couples have a *rendezvous*.

Incessantly throughout the evening one hears a sound as if someone were going around with a fly-swatter—it is the lovers kissing.[37]

So now the first war with Cordelia begins, in which I flee, and thereby teach her to triumph in pursuing me. . . . When she at last feels free, so free that she is almost tempted to break with me, then the second war begins. . . . The first (is) . . . a war of liberation . . . only a game; the second is a war of conquest, it is for life and death.[38]

After she has broken the engagement, and when the psychological stage is perfectly set, he makes love to her, never sees her again, returns

34. I, 281.
35. I, 290.
36. I, 305.
37. I, 315.
38. I, 319.

her letters unopened, and leaves her in despair. The final entry in the Diary reads:

> It is over now, and I hope never to see her again. When a girl has given away everything, then she is weak, then she has lost everything. . . . Now all resistance is impossible, and only as long as that is present is it beautiful to love; when it is ended there is only weakness and habit. I do not wish to be reminded of my relation to her; she has lost the fragrance, and the time is past when a girl suffering the pain of a faithless love can be changed into a heliotrope.[39]

Instead of being repelled (as Kierkegaard intended) or intrigued (as Copenhagen was) by the Diary, I find it a bit wearisome. There is some fine writing in it; there are piquant situations, sometimes in connection with other girls whom Johannes, at least temporarily, by-passes for the sake of concentrating on Cordelia; and, as always in Kierkegaard, one finds acute psychological observation, humor, and irony. But only a celibate (as he was, except for one possible slip) could make sex so complicated.

III

The position of Judge William (or "B"), the "author" of Volume II, embodies the most extensive treatment of the ethical stage by itself to be found in Kierkegaard's writings. S. K. became convinced that the ethical could not stand by itself, and that it must be incorporated in faith. Ethical tension may be the pedagogue which leads to faith by deepening despair, but *Fear and Trembling*, written soon after, shows how an attempt to regard the ethical as self-sufficient may become an obstacle to faith, and later works develop the same argument. Even Judge William shows some awareness of this point of view, especially when he appends a sermon by a "friend" to his concluding ultimatum.

The first of the two long letters is entitled "The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage."[40] It is directed against "A's" spectator attitude, his spiritual procrastination, his aesthetic drifting. The desire to remain an observer is exposed as a form of haughtiness, an attempt to play both God and Fate in the lives of people—when God Himself can only be one of the two. "A's" lack of long range purpose comes out crucially in his negative attitude toward marriage; therefore "B" undertakes the task of showing

39. I, 371.
40. Cf. *Stages*, where Judge William again discusses marriage.

how aesthetic values can be fulfilled and transcended, instead of destroyed, within that relationship; indeed, he admits that unless Christianity can unite romantic love and marriage, it "does not represent the highest development of the human race."[41]

"B" takes account of the cultural obstacles:

> Our age reminds one vividly of the dissolution of the Greek city-state: everything goes on as usual, and yet there is no longer any one who believes in it. The invisible spiritual bond which gives it validity no longer exists, and so the whole age is at once comic and tragic—tragic because it is perishing, comic because it goes on.[42]

These words have wide implications; as applied to love, they show why it is often unaccountably empty in "our age." At one extreme, sensual immorality draws a cloak of enslaving "enjoyments" over a melancholy which makes impossible the trust and commitment involved in marriage. And at the other extreme, the marriage of convenience conceals despair beneath common-sense calculation. These extremes miss the "impress of eternity" which is placed upon both romantic love and marriage; so do those traitors who make matrimony a mockery by wishing they could get out of it after they have let romantic love die within it.

"A" fails to see how Christian marriage can fulfil that spiritual longing for the infinite which is implicit in "first love."[43] This is partly due to the fact that he seeks something contradictory; he wants to enjoy the freshness of romantic love and also have it recur constantly. He fails to grasp that eternal element which explains why lovers feel as though they had "always loved one another"; and it is precisely this element which can be brought into relationship with the religious (thanking God for love) and the ethical (*willing* to hold this love fast). Another cause of "A's" blindness is his misunderstanding of Christianity's teaching. True, St. Paul did write in favor of continency.[44] But his teaching as a whole does not repudiate beauty and the sensuous. His contrast between "flesh" and "spirit" refers not to a body-soul dualism, but to egocentricity vs. faith in God. When Pauline terms are understood, they imply that even "intellectual" pursuits can be "sarkical."[45] "A's" real reason for spurn-

41. II, 26.
42. II, 17.
43. For "A's" remarks on first love, see I, 208.
44. I Cor. 7:9.
45. Most Pauline scholars today would agree with "B" at this point.

ing marriage and the sanction of the church is simply pride; he does not want to acknowledge any higher power over him, and he refuses to admit the fact of sin; he wants to be a conquering male animal who can evade the religious requirement of humility in his love. Judge William therefore urges him to see that if matrimony fails to exceed the purely erotic in purpose and pliability, this is not the fault of God, Christianity or the wedding ceremony: it is man's own fault.

From their opposite standpoints both "A" and "B" can laugh at those who try to give "reasons" for marriage; "A," because he regards it as ludicrous, "B," because he regards it as an end in itself. To advocate it as a "school for character" is dreadful, for love is the only sufficient reason—morally, as well as aesthetically and religiously. A man who marries in order to improve his character deserves to get a Xantippe of a wife and unruly children, so as to receive a thorough "schooling." Yet marriage *can* be educative (though not by calculation); it may emancipate from enslavement to a bad case of batchelor's crotchets; it may teach one to see the significance of ordinary, daily things. Secondly, to advocate it in order to have children treats the marriage partners as mere means of production for the State. Nevertheless, indirectly, as the fruition of love, children are a blessing. "A" likes to toy with possibilities, but not with the possibility of children, since he wants all contingencies under his control. Thus he misses what can be learned from one's children: having preconceived maxims shattered, having a heart that is vulnerable to suffering love, and having a link with the race which enables one to understand his own past.

Still a third "reason" is sometimes given: to have a home. This makes the wife merely an extra-permanent domestic convenience; therefore any man who gives this reason should at least be honest enough to marry a trained nurse. Now "A" is such an expert at seeing through illusions that he can put the negative side of the argument with great brilliance.

> However, you have not reached the truth, you have come to a stop with the destruction of illusions, and inasmuch as you have wrought that destruction in all possible and imaginable directions, you have really worked yourself into a new illusion: the illusion that one can stop there.[46]

While it is true that having a home isn't everything, and the two partners should possess their own independent personalities, nevertheless,

46. II, 66.

when they are united, then it *can* mean "everything." "A," who is an entertaining guest, has access to many homes, yet he cannot enter into the invisible inner life of any of them; he remains rootless, alone in his despair, which he prefers to retain in a cowardly way instead of suffering the pain of being healed. Despite his psychological virtuosity, he is merely a diversion for his friends, never a confidant.

Obviously, the "reasons" for marriage just discussed are "good" ones; countless paltry ones, such as money, family prestige, jealousy, and the like, have been ignored. "B" has been concerned to establish only one point: both romantic and religious interests require that marriage shall have no finite "reasons." One might contend that since love does not need any ceremonial confirmation, the marriage service itself is a point at which the aesthetic is destroyed by the religious. But this would be a mistake. The service evokes the universally human by grafting the new marriage upon the body of the race. Offense at this shows a desire to stand outside the universally human, and that desire makes the love eccentric instead of unique. Even the mention of sin (in the service) is simply a reminder of man's universal lot, and his sinfulness is connected with his status as a spiritual creature. If the church ceremony seems to take no account of the erotic, this is because the erotic can be taken for granted; the religious task is to relate it to God.

"A's" disparagement of marriage arises mainly because he is afraid of the way in which it grasps the historical, the concrete, the mundane, and makes possible a steady development within the limitations of human existence. On the pretext of shunning confinement and boredom, he runs away from having to disclose his secret self to another person. He prefers to retain the "mysterious," ostensibly in defense of love; but love is truly fulfilled only in openness and trust. Those marriages where the husband preserves secrets because the wife is too weak to face the truth, are a case in point; he is being either domineering or over-solicitous; and in either case he should not deprive her of finding God through suffering. The marriage can be genuinely secure only where each has an opportunity to develop independent strength; then each can love a definitely formed "other," instead of a self-created figment. The only legitimate exception which Judge William allows, where a person should be discouraged from marrying, is in the case of an individual who is so complicated that he cannot reveal himself. This exception is, of course, Kierkegaard himself.

"A" pities married people because they are either bored, or they ought to be and are not. "B" pities "A" because the latter has felt love and cannot fulfil it. The beauty of marriage has to do with daily matters, and therefore has to be grasped by living through it, instead of by representing it in an artistic moment. This is why "A" is blind to it. He sees this conquest over time as monotonous, as a routinizing of the erotic. Admittedly marriage cannot sustain the rapturous instant of first love; that cannot be repeated; but by making affection cumulative, it can "live in the present," establishing proper relations to memory and hope.[47] Bachelors never celebrate their "anniversaries," because they are usually addicted to recollection or hope, instead of being able to mark the passage of time significantly. Finally, "A" calls marriage monotonous because he mistakes his restlessness for vitality—overlooking the vitality of quietude; and he refuses to be bound by duties. Actually, duty is the enemy only of false love, and the chief glory of a good marriage is that within it spontaneous inclinations and moral obligations can be perfectly united.

The second long letter in Volume II is entitled "Equilibrium between the Aesthetical and the Ethical in the Composition of Personality." Near the beginning stands the famous "Midnight hour" passage:

> Do you not know that there comes a midnight hour when everyone has to throw off his mask? Do you believe that life will always let itself be mocked? Do you think you can slip away a little before midnight in order to avoid this? Or are you not terrified by it? I have seen men in real life who so long deceived others that at last their true nature could not reveal itself. . . . Or can you think of anything more frightful than that it might end with your nature being resolved into a multiplicity, that you really might become . . . like those unhappy demoniacs, a legion, and you thus would have lost the inmost and holiest thing of all in a man, the unifying power of personality? Truly, you should not jest with that which is not only serious but dreadful. . . . My young friend, suppose there was no one who troubled himself to guess your riddle—what joy, then, would you have in it? But above all, for your own sake, . . . stop this wild flight, this passion of annihilation which rages in you; . . . for you are willing to admit that you are good for nothing, the only thing that gives you pleasure is to march seven times around existence and blow the trumpet and thereupon let the whole thing collapse, . . . that you may summon Echo forth —for Echo is heard only in emptiness.[48]

47. Cf. "The Unhappiest Man," in Vol. I.
48. II, 135f.

And the whole letter is, in a sense, an extension of this plea. It is a warning against suspending judgment until the moment comes when it is no longer possible to choose, a warning against a deliberative detachment which literally loses touch with existence. Thus "A" is confronted by an inescapable decision: not a decision between particular goods and evils, but a decision between accepting ethical status or excluding it.

He has tried to escape this *Either/Or* in the sphere of action, saying that since either alternative is mad, he will do nothing. Similarly philosophy (Hegel) tries to abolish this *Either/Or* by seeking a higher unity in the sphere of contemplation. The philosopher has a right to interpret history, so long as he remembers the relativity of his own position instead of presuming to occupy an absolute vantage point; but he has no right to confound thought with freedom. Philosophy can deal properly with logic, nature, and the external dynamics of history, where necessity rules; but no amount of information about the necessary can give guidance for action, which must always confront an *Either/Or*. The notion of a "necessary" action, in this ethical sense of "action," is a contradiction.

Inward freedom is exercised primarily, not in connection with doing particular things, but in resolving to be oneself, in "choosing" oneself. Thus the ethical includes the aesthetic by assigning it a relative position, instead of abolishing it. The aesthetic must be deprived of making absolute claims because it seeks happiness through conditions which cannot be posited entirely by the individual. These conditions may range from external factors like health, wealth, and prestige, to internal factors like talent; but so long as the foundation of a man's mode of life lies outside determination of the will, it is impossible for him to be "self-possessed." Instead, melancholy is always present—a melancholy which may drive him into wearisome excesses like those of Nero, where in bondage to dread he seeks to cast others into it, and in bondage to self-hatred he seeks to annihilate others. In any case, melancholy occurs whenever the development of character toward integrity is checked. One may even fail to discern the cause; but "as soon as a man knows the cause, the melancholy is done away with."[49] The basic cause is sin—a failure to will deeply and sincerely, and to become perfectly transparent to oneself. To say this is not to disparage human nature; rather, it is to

49. II, 159.

recognize that sin and melancholy *can* be cured—by humility before God.

There is a view of life—Cynicism in the strict sense—which also counsels enjoying the self and ignoring external conditions; but it is really a reaction of despair, which constantly circumscribes the scope of personality. Similarly, "A's" despair has prevented him from entering into possession of himself; he is afraid to participate fully in life because that would deprive him of the opportunity to deceive himself. Instead, he treats life as a meaningless series of diversions. He even turns "faith" into romantic clap-trap, as a fanciful cover for skepticism. He prefers to cling to an idealized picture of himself, because, if he revealed himself, he might turn out to be quite ordinary. In a sense, the detachment which puts him above petty discontents and vulgar hedonism is sound, since nothing finite can satisfy the human spirit; but his skepticism has destroyed the finite without putting anything in its place; and the spirit takes its revenge in melancholy. He sees that his sorrow, like everything else, is transitory; and this leaves him only a transitory joy to turn to—the laughter of despair. If sensuality attracted him, he would be lost; but since he cannot retreat, he must go forward; he must penetrate more deeply into his own despair; he must voluntarily undertake the suffering involved in "finding himself," in order to discover the seriousness of human life in which the spirit is related to an eternal power.

> Above all, have a little more reverence for woman; . . . if it was a woman that ruined man, it was woman also that has fairly and honestly made reparation and still does so; out of a hundred men who go astray in the world ninety and nine are saved by women and one by immediate divine grace.[50]

But this is not to advocate marriage simply as a means of getting over melancholy.

> If you are unable to sustain yourself, you will hardly get another person who is capable of sustaining you.[51]

No, he must go forward into despair, not over particular external misfortunes, but in such a way that he can love the world instead of hating

50. II, 174. In his preface, "Victor Eremita" says of this remark: "It is easy to see that (B) has not been very rigid in his reckoning, since he provides no place at all for those who are actually lost."

51. II, 174.

it. One can learn to love people only by discovering that eternal, spiritual factor in himself and others which abolishes finite distinctions of race and class and makes us all equal in the sight of God.

Despair must not be confused with philosophic doubt, for the one involves the whole personality, while the other concerns only thought. An objective approach to life is bound to be incomplete, because it deals only with thought; yet the "tranquil" philosopher may actually be using his speculation to anesthetize an underlying despair which exists because he fails to *will.* Identification with the logically necessary movement of an impersonal Absolute (Hegel) swallows up the self—the individual will—on which all ethical distinctions depend. Only the exercise of freedom, in the face of life's contradictions, can enable a man to "discover himself"; and even the most miserable people cling tightly to this core of individuality.[52]

Admittedly freedom involves a paradox; for the self comes into being through choice, and yet it must already exist as the chooser. This paradox is a salient reminder that a man finds himself, not by creating himself *ex nihilo,* but only by affirming his own history as it links him with his own past and organically connects him with the race. Such affirmation involves *choosing* to repent, not merely for what he has done by his own volition, but for what others have done to him;[53] and this initial choice is present in every subsequent choice. In Christianity, self-acceptance has found its true expression in *continual* repentance.

Obviously the kind of despair which accompanies worldliness is different from the "voluntary" despair that leads to salvation. The first come from finitizing the self, from making its happiness depend upon external fortune; and a man is cast into it against his will. The second involves absolute resignation, not in a sense which allows one mystically to escape from history, but in a sense which involves a continual spiritual act in the midst of history. Aesthetic categories must be transcended, though not destroyed, because they cannot adequately grasp the issue involved. From a purely aesthetic standpoint anybody can be "good," while to be "bad" usually requires talent. Moreover, in the face of mis-

52. Judge William declares (II, 180) that even suicides seek, not annihilation of individuality, but escape from unhappiness. Augustine makes a similar point in *De Libero Arbitrio,* Bk. III, Ch. VI.

53. S.K. is thinking primarily of the effects of his father's guilt upon his own sombre childhood.

fortune, the aesthete either whimpers or assumes a proud role of tragic pathos; the best remedy would be for him to think of his own guilt, and thus give himself something really to cry about.

Mysticism also fails to grasp this "self-affirmation through repentance," because it involves isolation; it repudiates "the world" and human ties, through which alone one can become enough of a concrete individual to come into personal relationship with God. By making special claims, the mystic sunders himself from men and implies that God plays favorites.[54] He repents, to be sure, but "metaphysically"—in such a way as to escape from temporal existence, instead of "ethically"—in such a way as to define concretely his relationship to temporal existence. Time exists, not for God's sake, but for man's so that he can have a history and freely impart significance to it through decision. Human history is not a series of "happenings"; for man can transform even what has simply "happened" to him from necessity to freedom, by taking responsibility for his selfhood with *all* its conditioning.

The ethical is sometimes defined as living for the fulfillment of duty.[55] But this brings it into disrepute as an external tyrant opposed to pleasure. The goal of the ethical life is inward transparency, knowledge of all the traits of the self—not something externally imposed, which is to be realized by "forcing." A genuinely ethical man seeks unification of personality and leaves himself elbow room for action toward this end; a legalist imprisons himself within a multiplicity of duties. Actually, since universal obligations are only encountered as particularized for the individual's life, which has its teleology in itself, a man is always able to fulfill what is "duty for him."

> Since this person has not created himself but chosen himself, duty is the expression of his absolute dependence and of his absolute freedom as identical with one another.[56]

The aesthetic must be made subordinate to the ethical, because the latter alone applies to all individuals, and lifts the purpose of man's ex-

54. The case of the "mystical" Ludwig (II, 206) who committed suicide, shows that in his isolation S.K. was attracted to what he here calls mysticism, but put the temptation aside. For some reason he often identified himself with the name of Ludwig.

55. The reference is obviously to Kant, though he is not mentioned by name.

56. II, 26. Compare Schleiermacher, who construed absolute dependence in terms ulterior to ethical categories, and therefore failed to do justice to freedom.

istence above accidental considerations. Judge William emphasizes his point by following an imaginary "young man" as he encounters concrete situations. The young man discovers that an aesthetic career is open only to those who have money, talent, or an avocation, but that ethics can give *every* man a calling. This contrast, when applied to marriage, brings out the fact that an attempt to make love aesthetically "extraordinary" is egoistic, while making it a calling enables one to realize the universal.

> In calling a man a hero one must reflect not so much upon what he does as upon how he does it. One man may conquer kingdoms and lands without being a hero, another may show himself a hero by ruling his own spirit. . . . Whenever (a man) is tempted to want to be . . . extraordinary, his wife will at once orient him again.[57]

Hence the kind of man who is always seeking infinitude needs the companionship of a woman who comprehends finitude. Once there was a learned orientalist who was almost going mad over a dot on his manuscript which created an unheard of vocalization; his wife saved his sanity, and prevented "a terrible alarm in literary organs"[58] by blowing what turned out to be a speck of dust off the page. Suppose he had not been married!

The kind of friendships which "A" forms are no substitute. In fact, they are futile; for he seeks someone who can laugh with him about the misery of existence, though the real misery is that one must always laugh alone. Genuine friendship, which finds its most complete expression in marriage, will remain impossible for him so long as he holds back and refuses to become revealed.

> I have just one question I would put to you: . . . do you really laugh when you are alone? You know what I mean. I do not ask whether it sometimes or even frequently occurs to you to laugh when you are alone, but whether you take satisfaction in this lonely laughter.[59]

In conclusion, however, Judge William again makes room for the exceptional case of a man who for some reason cannot incorporate the universal (marriage) in his life. While it is the happy lot of others to

57. II, 249.
58. II, 260.
59. II, 273.

bear witness to the universal by realizing it, such a man must bear witness to it by his sorrow. To become "extraordinary" in this sense "means something different from the capricious satisfaction of one's wilful lust."[60] Then follows an amazingly accurate prophecy concerning Kierkegaard's own life:

> He will perhaps some day experience the joy that what caused him pain and made him lowly in his own eyes proves to be an occasion for his being lifted up again and becoming in a nobler sense an extraordinary man. What he lost in compass he gained perhaps in intensive inwardness.[61]

This may sound like conceited self-dramatization; but it also proves that one who was so discerning in other respects could hardly avoid being discerning with regard to his own significance.

Attached to the "Ultimatum," which stands after the second letter, is a sermon, ostensibly written by a friend of Judge William, entitled "The Edification Implied in the Thought that as Against God We Are always in the Wrong." The main purpose of the sermon is to show how the Christian doctrine of sin takes a high instead of a low view of man by attaching full weight to human responsibility. The doctrine is set incisively in opposition to the popular dictum that everyone "does the best he can."

> No earnest doubt, no really deep concern, is put to rest by the saying that one does what he can.[62]

The motive of self-justification behind this cheap rationalization is all too obvious. If the profoundest spiritual ills of mankind arise from the insistence upon always being "in the right," then those ills cannot be cured until men drop all their defences in the presence of God. No one can be compelled to acquire this humility; the appeal can be made only to freedom. But once the humbling step is taken, it is animating, not stultifying; for to admit one's own faults fully involves a recognition of the love of God, and this recognition carries with it gratitude and hope. Therefore it is "edifying" to realize that, although we may sometimes be in the right as against other men, we are always in the wrong when we measure our lives against God's love.

60. II, 277.
61. II, 277.
62. II, 287.

This review is already far too long to leave room for general appraisal of *Either/Or*. Besides endeavoring to give an accurate indication of its contents, I have been concerned mainly to bring out the fact that, from the outset of his career as a writer, Kierkegaard had a remarkable grasp of many principles which have given him a distinctive place in Protestant thought. Moreover, it is especially worth observing that, although this and subsequent works anticipate psycho-therapy with observations about isolation, anxiety, self-affirmation, unification of personality, and capacity for entering "openly" into human relations, it took him the rest of his life (fifteen years) to work out the implications of what he, in some sense, "understood" at the beginning. In other words, his own situation was a constant reminder that it is possible to know a great deal (objectively) about psychology, ethics, and religion, without embodying it (subjectively) in one's own spiritual existence.

The Timaeus and the Critias or Atlanticus. By PLATO. The Thomas Taylor Translation. Foreword by R. CATESBY TALIAFERRO. (The Bollingen Series) New York: Pantheon Books, 1944. 249 pp. $2.75.

The new edition of Thomas Taylor's translations needs no apology or defense. The most recent student of his life and work characterizes the "pagan Taylor" (1758-1835) as "the most energetic exponent of Platonism in England between the Cambridge Platonists and Benjamin Jowett."[1] For the wide diffusion of his translations in America we have Emerson's testimony;[2] for the interest which Coleridge took in his labors upon the Neoplatonists, Professor Lowes' *Road to Xanadu* (pp. 232 ff.) should be consulted. Taylor approached Plato entirely through the commentaries of the "divine" Neoplatonists and read him with Neoplatonic eyes. His mind was filled with Jamblichus and Proclus, with speculations about gods and demons, and about the supranatural qualities of the elements; scarcely anything in the Neoplatonic system was too abstruse for him to swallow. His Introduction and Notes to the *Timaeus* abound in lengthy quotations from these writers. A complete stranger to the historical point of view, he continues the "theosophic" exegesis of Plato's works which the Neoplatonists had handed on to the Byzantines, and the Byzantines to the Italians of the Renaissance. For the contemporary world, its science and religion, he seems to have had an unmitigated contempt; they seemed to him to stand in urgent need of a Neoplatonic redemption. How, indeed, should a mind drunk with the vision of "the harmonious union of things" and of the great chain and "procession" of intelligible entities be patient with the painstaking follies of the moderns, who have "just been able to gain a glimpse of the beautiful union of things" and consider it an achievement "to have discovered that the lowest of the animal species and the highest of the vegetable approximate so near to each other" (Introd. p. 59).

It is a matter of no small interest that such a whole-hearted return to the visions and spiritual exploits of the Neoplatonists was possible in the Romantic period. Taylor is the extreme but by no means the only repre-

1. F. B. Evans, *P. M. L. A.* (1940), p. 1060.

2. *English Traits*, ch. 17 (I owe this reference to Mr. Craig R. Thompson). For Emerson's own high opinion of Taylor see *Complete Works* (Riverside Edition) VIII, 50. Cf. J. S. Harrison, *The Teachers of Emerson* (New York, 1910) pp. 3 ff, 263 ff.

sentative of this trend. Friedrich Creuzer's name comes to mind, and one remembers that even Schelling and Hegel—in a way also Goethe[3]—succumbed to the spell of Neoplatonic ideas and symbols. How could the strange plant of Neoplatonism take root and flower in the soil of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries? One would have wished that Mr. Taliaferro had tried to throw some light on these questions, that he had helped us to understand the mind of Thomas Taylor and had shown how, at a time when the professional classicists and the professional philosophers took little interest in Plato and the intelligentsia had on the whole lost sight of him, Neoplatonism could rush into the vacuum and enjoy its last triumph, immediately before the advent of historical scholarship.

Unfortunately, he is content to declare: "Taylor's approach is perfectly defensible if you are not subject to the bugaboo of exact historical research and willing to consider the development of a doctrine for itself." What we need is understanding rather than "defense"; as a matter of fact, although in the next paragraph he assures us again that Taylor's approach is "perfectly defensible and even desirable," Mr. Taliaferro makes no attempt at either understanding or defending him, but goes on to replace Taylor's approach to the *Timaeus* by his own, which resembles Taylor's only in the negative characteristic that it too has very few points of contact with "exact historical research."

It surely takes courage to enter the ranks against such scholarly and highly competent commentators of the *Timaeus* as A. E. Taylor and F. M. Cornford, for A. E. Taylor brings a huge philosophical erudition to his task, while the late Cornford possessed the rare combination of a fine understanding for the ways of mythical imagination and a sure touch in matters of science, and both were aided by a lifelong familiarity with Plato's language. Against such formidable equipment Mr. Taliaferro relies on his knowledge of the history of modern science. Yet, if modern science is brought to bear on the *Timaeus* without the necessary caution and discrimination, it will be a boomerang rather than a bonanza. It may be possible to illustrate some conceptions of the *Timaeus* by Platonizing features in Copernicus, Kepler, and Galilei, but a method which leads to the explanation of Plato's astronomy on the basis

3. See Franz Koch, *Goethe und Plotin* (Leipzig, 1925); for Schelling and the Neoplatonists, *ibid.* pp. 28 ff. and *pass.*; also Nicolai Hartmann, *Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus* (Berlin, 1923), I, 155.

of the Copernican system can hardly recommend itself by its results. In defending his views, Mr. Taliaferro never comes to grips with Plato's actual text; nor does he discuss the ancient testimonies about Plato's opinion. He brushes aside Cornford's explanation of the difficult passage *Tim.* 40 B/C, but makes no attempt to meet the very serious difficulties which, as Cornford has shown, confront an interpretation of the passage along non-geocentric lines. He assures us that "from the observations which the Greeks possessed"—which observations and how do we know that they were available to Plato?—a "rough estimate" may be made of the distances of the planets from the mean sun which would lead to the figures which Plato employs for the intervals on his scale of the World-Soul—provided we read 14 where Plato has 9 and regard another figure as "arbitrary." He knows, of course, that Plato's intervals are those of the diatonic scale, but where these intervals do not agree with the distances which he wishes to find he falls back upon the concept of "Necessity," i.e., the *Ananke* of later sections of the *Timaeus*, which in truth does not enter at all into the construction of the World-Soul. According to Mr. Taliaferro, this *Ananke* is "finally presented as the possibility of a four-dimensional manifold of space and time" (p. 33). The reader who learns that "the soul is to body as whole number ratio is to the incommensurable ratio" may wonder whether Neoplatonism could do much better, and whether Thomas Taylor would not have cause to revise his judgment of modern science.

The new publication of what are probably the most important among Taylor's translations remains a valuable feat. The fair-minded student will hardly apply to them the verdict which Coleridge passed on Taylor's renderings from the Neoplatonists, to wit, that "difficult Greek is transmuted into incomprehensible English."[4] The translations are readable. Mistakes and inaccuracies there are, but they are not as numerous as is sometimes alleged. We have more adequate translations now, and Thomas Taylor will—or, at least, should—be studied for Taylor's sake, not for Plato's sake.

It would have been no violation of piety if the current chapter divisions—or, better, Stephanus pages—of Plato's works had been added in parenthesis to the text of Taylor's translation, and if the passages

4. *Memorials of Coleorton, Being Letters from Coleridge,* etc. (Boston and New York, 1887) II, 107.

which Taylor quotes from his Neoplatonic authorities had been identified.

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Advance through Storm: A. D. 1914 and After, with Concluding Generalizations. Vol. VII of *A History of the Expansion of Christianity.* By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945. xiii, 542 pages. $4.00.

With this seventh volume, Professor Latourette's now famous work reaches its end. Its place is established in the forefront of histories of Christianity. This being so, it seems absurd to labor the point that this *is* history, not propaganda. True, from the beginning the author has borne witness to his Christian faith, and in the closing pages of this volume he sets down a noble assertion of it. But, tested by the severest standards, these books constitute a history, broadly and profoundly conceived, enormously learned, to the last degree faithful to fact, wise and cautious in judgment, impartial. However it seems, there is relevance in insisting on this point, because Professor Latourette's main conclusion, the advance of Christianity, with ebb and flow, to its highest power among mankind at 1944, with many supporting conclusions, is likely to be challenged, on various grounds and under various influences; or if not challenged, depreciated. More than once he shows that this is in his mind. His answer to dispute and neglect is merely more unbiassed history. Those who would dispute him need to be wary, for he is prepared at every turn with chapter and verse of proof.

Of the two distinct parts of the present volume much the larger is given to the period 1914-1944. By contrast with the conditions of 1815-1914 which generally assisted the momentous gains of Christianity described in the three volumes of *The Great Century*, this was an age of conditions of "Storm," all apparently adverse to Christianity and some actually such, which are familiar to us all but take on fresh meaning as here set in this light. Contrary to a supposition prevalent among those who have neglected the facts, Professor Latourette says that the word for Christianity in 1914-1944 is "Advance." "Christianity, far from disappearing, in 1944 was a more potent factor in the total world-scene than in 1914." This he maintains in three chapters of survey and sum-

mary. The detailed support for this contention he provides in 314 large pages, crowded with particulars and copiously documented, describing the state of Christianity in eleven regions covering the world. He appraises this by the "three criteria" applied throughout his history, "geographic extent, new movements emerging from the Christian stream, and the effect upon mankind." As before, the influence of the environment upon Christianity and changes in it thereby caused are taken into account.

To suggest the judgments on these eleven regions: in Europe—specially admirable sections treat Germany and Russia—"Numerically and in organized strength Christianity suffered sorely." "In some respects, however, Christianity was stronger than in 1914 and was more of a force in the life of Europe." In the United States church membership continued, as through the nineteenth century, to increase faster than the population, so that "what may be called the mass conversion of the country . . . was still going on." "Whether or not this meant an enhanced permeation of the life of the United States by Christianity could be debated. Yet by 1945 there were indications that for a growing minority the Christian faith was more intelligently held and given a more thorough commitment than in 1914." For three of the other nine regions, Northern Africa and the Near East, Southeastern Asia, and the Japanese Empire the report is doubtful. For the other six regions, together far more important in the world, the report is advance, and in three cases, Africa South of the Sahara, India, and China, rapid advance. A 50-page chapter on China, especially valuable because of the author's missionary service there, concludes that in the thirty years "Christianity continued its phenomenal gains." "The totals of both Protestant and Roman Catholic Chinese about doubled." In both forms of Christianity strong Chinese leaders arose more numerously and national church organizations were built up. "Christianity was more active than any other religion." Its influence for good on many aspects of Chinese society notably grew, and from among the Christians, a small minority to be sure, "were emerging many who stood in the forefront of the nation's life."

Distinctive general features of the Christian movement in 1914-1944 witnessing to fresh vigor are noted. With the exceptions referred to, numerical increase was conspicuous. "The percentage of Christians among non-Occidental peoples had approximately doubled in the thirty years."

Advance came through Protestantism and Roman Catholicism; Eastern Christianity showed recession, mainly for political reasons. Roman Catholicism, to which learned and sympathetic consideration is given, displayed high vitality and bore a relatively larger share in the propagation of Christianity than in the nineteenth century. In the United States it gained in numbers, though somewhat less than Protestantism, and in influence. But, on the whole, Protestantism "was probably still . . . the channel through which the Christian stream was flowing most strongly; . . . was still the most active wing of the church." Christianity met the test of "new movements" in Roman Catholicism by the formation of many new missionary societies and a general marked strengthening of ambition, organization, and action; and even more in Protestantism, especially in church co-operation and union, the rapid rise of the ecumenical movement, and changes in thought, the spread of the theology of crisis, reaction from nineteenth century liberalism, and fresh sense of "the unique character of the Christian gospel," over against some tendency to reciprocal relations with other faiths. In the ecumenical movement Protestant churches in all lands drew together, and Eastern churches joined them in a world-wide fellowship "quite new in Christian history." In both Protestant and Roman Catholic missions on a large scale indigenous leadership was developed, responsibility transferred, and church structures of the peoples built up, causing deeper rootage. In all forms of Christianity, "more than at any other time since the first three centuries," Professor Latourette sees a trend away from the idea of "a society . . . collectively Christian" toward the idea of a church of higher standards, "in the world but never fully of it." While this did not appear so much in the United States and several countries of Europe and of European antecedents, he is impressed by a rising tendency in this direction. Finally, Christians generally were more consciously governed by the ideal of transforming the world, and the author holds that "if mankind was surveyed as a whole, Christianity was clearly a growing factor in human affairs."

In the second part of the book, conclusive of the whole history, a chapter on "The Course Thus Far Traversed" gathers the substance of the seven volumes. Obviously it is impossible to do much with this in a review. Professor Latourette outlines the movement of Christianity in great periods, advance to A.D. 500, recession 500-950, "a forward push" to 1350, again recession to 1500, "the next surge of the tide" to 1750, "a

pause" to 1815, the era 1815-1914 of signal progress to world-wide strength, then 1914-1944, a time of losses and delays but also of "significant gains." In fifty pages of wonderful grasp and solidity and interest he depicts the fortunes of Christianity in these ages—the forces and processes of its expansion, its organizations, the kinds and varieties which it developed, its relations to civilizations and states and religions and movements of all sorts in human life, conditions favorable and unfavorable which it encountered, transformations produced in it by its environments, its effect in the world. No comparable review of the history of Christianity exists. No historian has approached Professor Latourette in escape from being "occident-centered" and in taking a true world-view. A review can give no idea of the amazing knowledge and insight displayed in these pages and the light they throw on the history of Christianity and of the world in the Christian era. The author's conclusion these quotations indicate: "as in A.D. 1944, the historian looked back, . . . he was conscious that as by successive pulses of a great tide the faith had gained in the affairs of men. . . . More than any other religion . . . it was becoming universal. Its history had demonstrated that it appealed to individuals in all races, nations and stages of culture. . . . Especially after A.D. 1815 it had become planted among practically all peoples and tribes, and after A.D. 1914 was becoming firmly rooted in the texture of their cultures . . . no other religion had a similiar record."

"A Comparison with the Records of Other Religions" puts Christianity beside Islam, Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, in the light "of spread, of decline, and of interaction with the environment." It would be out of the question to do more than suggest this chapter's extraordinary compressed wealth of sympathetic understanding of the inner spirit of the religions considered and acquaintance with their histories. By comparison, the author judges, Christianity is unique, in its much wider geographical spread, its power to survive cultures with which it had been associated and to win and mold new cultures, its resources of inward revival, its manifold services to human welfare, its uplifting of men and women everywhere.

This leads on to "The Conclusion of the Whole Matter," a condensed chapter containing "an appraisal . . . of the larger implications" of the history. Here there is inevitably repetition, as elsewhere in this volume because of its structure. The book, though long, is so compact of matter

that repetition is no disadvantage. This chapter essays a view of the religious future, as a historian can do this, asking whether it can be said on grounds of history that Christianity has the promise of becoming the universal religion and bringing mankind to its ideals. There are the facts that it has spread chiefly "at the expense of polytheism and animism," and while it has won numbers of individuals from Confucianism, there have been "relatively few converts from Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism"; also that Christianity is still largely associated with Western culture, though it has shown power beyond any other religion to naturalize itself in others. Over against these considerations is the unique record of Christianity's expansion and redemption of individuals and beneficence to society according to its standards, stronger right down to 1944, "an incoming tide." While other religions "have slowed down," Christianity in the latest time "has had its greatest geographic extention and its widest influence." Hence the conviction which permeates this book that Christianity "is still young, . . . is only at the beginning of its history," that "the Christian story is only in its inception." So viewing the facts, the historian says: "The record of so much of the course of Christianity as has become history seems to presage a continued expansion in the area covered and in the effect upon human-kind as a whole." Professor Latourette is no Utopian. He thinks that if Christianity becomes the universal religion, it will be "only after a vast reach of time." He thinks that "the Christian ideal and the historical process are each such that perfection, as the Christian judges perfection, will not be attained within time" but beyond history. Yet this does not mean futility, as Christian progress with its solid eternal good proves. The author is convinced out of the history that however Christianity expands and grows, it will not be by synthesis with other religions. Despite its many varieties, one broad type of Christianity is shown by the record to have had in all Christian time the power of propagation and revival and influence, that which "had always held to the uniqueness of Jesus and had insisted that through Him God had supremely revealed Himself and had wrought for the redemption and transformation of man." With witness to his personal faith of this kind, grounded on the record, Professor Latourette ends his great history.

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Doom and Resurrection. By Joseph L. Hromadka, with an introduction by John A. Mackay. Richmond, Virginia: Madrus House, 1945, 122 pp. $2.00.

Doom and Resurrection is an important book by one of the greatest European Protestant scholars, a distinguished Czech refugee, who is at present in the United States. It deserves careful reading and should open the minds of American readers to the important work that has been done in the last years by Czech and other Slavonic scholars, which has been too often overlooked. It is, in a very real sense, a scholarly and understanding evaluation of the religious crisis that has accompanied the present destructive World War and that bids fair to continue its disintegrating work until the civilized world is entirely destroyed, or until it is itself brought to an end. The present volume deserves attention from two points of view, the nature of the crisis and the Slavonic reaction to it.

In 1912, Rev. J. Neville Figgis, a member of the Community of the Resurrection in England and a man destined to lose his life as a result of German submarine activity in the First World War, published a volume called *Civilization at the Crossroads.* In this he predicted the complete downfall of modern civilization, unless the world turned back to Christian doctrine which alone could make Christian ethics acceptable to mankind. This volume of Professor Hromádka thirty-three years later is only a commentary on the further steps of that disintegration. Yet while it has gained in the historical proof of the thesis, it is hardly as broad in scope, for the author is definitely writing for the Protestant world. He sees the crisis aided by the breakdown of many Protestant traditions, and his thought does not allow him to touch the responsibility and the role of Catholics of all branches and schools of thought in abetting this breakdown, and in assisting in the recovery. It is for this reason that he can single out the circle of Karl Barth as the outstanding attempt to place Christianity once more on the offensive.

Yet, for the American reader, the most valuable parts are the sections dealing with Dostoyevsky, Masaryk, and Rádl, and still more the clearly stated doubt as to whether the Anglo-Saxon religious philosophy will be able to stand the test that is certain to be put upon it. President Masaryk was an ardent admirer of Anglo-Saxon thought. Professor Rádl lost faith in it, and we can feel in these lectures the growing doubt in the mind of Professor Hromádka. This is especially significant, for

Czechoslovakia, the westernmost of the Slavonic nations, has for centuries been drawn between a Western and an Eastern orientation, between the desire to play a role in Western civilization and the feeling of membership in the Eastern Slavonic family. Without consoling ourselves with self-righteousness, we may well wonder whether the alarming symptoms seen by these Czech scholars (cf. p. 81) represent by any means the purely negative tendencies that they seem to the Protestants of Europe.

A large part of the book deals with Dostoyevsky, undoubtedly the greatest and deepest of the Slavonic thinkers of the past century, and in general it is a far sounder interpretation than that given by many contemporary students of the writer, who are inclined to overemphasize the feeling of doubleness in the mind of the writer, an idea in which President Masaryk seems to have shared. Yet is there not a subtle and important difference between Masaryk's "Jesus or Caesar" and Dostoyevsky's distinction between the God-man and the man-god? Is there not an attempt on the part of the Czech thinkers to accept human civilization and truth as containing something more than Dostoyevsky wished to assign to them?

Perhaps, in this connection, it would have been fitting for the writer to have mentioned Solovyev's *Three Conversations* and his *Vision of Antichrist*, which appeared in 1899. Solovyev was a friend and disciple of Dostoyevsky in the flesh. Together they visited the Orthodox monasteries. They talked and prayed together and, despite his religious wanderings, Solovyev came to the conclusion, like Dostoyevsky, that the world was sick. He tried to adapt the book of Revelation to modern times, and, in his picture of the Antichrist, he makes that ominous figure carry through during his brief reign all those social reforms for which the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were striving. The belief in Christ was the one thing necessary for man if he would be saved, and it is interesting that, in the final scene before the return of Christ in glory, Peter and John and Paul are united in a fellowship of love and faith.

Professor Hromádka has ably diagnosed the present religious crisis and the collapse of Christian civilization. He clearly sees that only a return to faith in Christ can save it from further destruction. Yet the thoughtful reader will inevitably ask himself what elements of that dying past can be fitted into the new and better order. What form will it take? Karel Capek, in his plays and novels, predicted the destruction

of mechanical civilization and a return to the simple agricultural life. Professor Hromádka apparently believes that it will be a change of spirit perhaps more than of external form of life, for he looks with more nostalgia at the seemingly great achievments of the past. No one can predict the future save in general terms, but the great significance of this book is its revelation of the ideas of the Czech Protestants, the giving to the American reader of a summary of their point of view, and the religious certainty that Christ is still carrying out His mission and waiting for humanity to repent and aid him. For this we can be grateful to the author, and we can ask no more than he chooses to give us, a powerful message of condemnation and of hope.

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Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth. By ERICH FRANK. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1945. x, 209 pp. $2.50.

This book has merit which, the reader should be warned, will be obscured, perhaps, in my discussion of it. For though I regard it as good of its kind, I cannot like the kind.

The author's position seems to be about as follows. Augustine, supplemented by Aquinas and Kant, establishes the main lines of a sound philosophy of religion. "Modern man" is essentially anti-religious, and essentially mistaken even where he is religious (as in James, Whitehead, Bergson, etc.). The mistake of modern man is to suppose that reason and nature suffice, that there is nothing save what can be known by empirical science or by rationalistic proofs, and nothing outside of space and time, from which it follows either that there is no God or that nature, the space-time process, is God. On the contrary, there is a God, as we can know negatively through discovering that the meaning of life tends to be destroyed by the denial of God, and further, this God as thus known, and as revealed in the Jewish-Christian tradition, is creator of the world, not the world. He is beyond space and time altogether.

This reviewer cannot quarrel with certain parts of the above thesis. He admits that the denial of God, if carried through resolutely, refutes itself by threatening to dehumanize life completely and make nonsense of our basic purposes. He admits, also, that it is a fashionable error to

suppose that empirical science, in any useful sense of this phrase, can yield all the knowledge of reality that we should hope to attain. He admits finally that every man has to view the universe in a manner not to be wholly determined by impersonal reason, and that reason itself can see that this is so. But I think Dr. Frank dangerously underestimates the role of reason in this matter, partly because he identifies reason largely with the philosophical devices of past ages (as in the systems of Aristotle or Kant), and partly because he identifies religious truth with orthodoxy. Assuming that the possibilities both of religion and of philosophy were substantially exhausted long ago, then I for one would conclude that philosophical understanding cannot embrace God. But if we admit that revelation, the *human* intuitive reception of the divine, is fallible, then it is perfectly possible that orthodoxy involved distortions of the beatific vision. And it is equally possible that many, or even all, philosophers, for many centuries failed to discover the best way to conceive God. In particular, I think modern inquiry has uncovered reasons which are probably definitive for rejecting a simple contrast of God as eternal and the world as temporal and spatial. These reasons are both philosophical and religious; they appeal both to ordinary experience and to revelation. We are, many of us, of the opinion that the purely timeless and absolutistic view of deity was a secular error, a mistake due to the not wholly critical rationalistic speculations of other days, which became confused with the really religious elements in the theory of religion. To my mind, Frank's book is an example of the subtle blend of the worship of God and the worship of something all too human which Niebuhr has taught us to fear in all the workings of man's mind. The something all too human in this case is the religious, or still more, the theological, tradition. This tradition refers to God, but decidedly it is not God. There is no reason why it may not contain irreligious elements, all the more dangerous because they are labeled religious, even by the opponents of religion.

According to Dr. Frank, the basic religious idea is that of creation, or of the dependence of all things upon God. The Greeks, on the whole, lacked this idea. For them nature was divine, full of gods. Even Plato supposed that God worked upon a "chaos" that he did not create. With the Jewish-Christian view all this was changed, "the world once for all ceased to be divine or animate; it has become an entirely prosaic organism which can be grasped simply as a chain of causes and effects." A

world soul, which would be something between God and the human mind, cannot be admitted by religion. Now all this is conventional. But I cannot think it is correct. The book of Genesis is hardly concerned with the distinction between creation as a molding of chaos and creation as, so to speak, a molding of non-being. The religiously important point was the supreme power of God, expressed in all we see. It is philosophy, not religion, which raises such questions as, is God *in every sense and absolutely* timeless and spaceless, absolute and independent? These prying curiosities as to exact definitions are, from the religious point of view, made at their own peril. The author admits that the Hebrew usually said, not that God was timeless but that he was "strong," implying indestructibility and incorruptibility, but hardly (I should think) the total absence of change in any and every sense. Not all change is corruption. Certainly the word "absolute" is not biblical, and even "perfect" is used only in an ethical, not a metaphysical, sense. Again, wherever it is said that God changes not, the context indicates that the reference is to the ethical reliability of God, or his adherence to purposes once adopted, and it would be easy to show that this by no means implies his invariance in every respect. Rather the contrary. Again, take Plato's chaos, why not interpret this as the anarchic element of creaturely freedom and responsibility, very much a Christian and Jewish idea? God's creative action consists in setting limits to the potentialities of chaos inherent in a vast society of more or less self-active beings. (Like most of those who take Kant so seriously, the author has no clear grasp of the idea of activity as essentially creative, as only approximately *capable* of being conformed to any exact law, or of being wholly determined by any antecedent or external condition or control.)

So my first point is that the notion of God put forth in this book is in no sense a biblical one. My second point is that the philosophical arguments suggested for the notion are invalid, to be opposed by stronger arguments. For example, the author contends that the nature of time is such that our true goal must stretch beyond time. Time is the "abyss of non-existence out of which emerges the present, and into which it sinks back again." Only through memory and anticipation have past and future any reality (Augustine), and thus time is fully actual "only in the human soul." "My childhood is not real at this moment, yet I can remember it." Now Dr. Frank sees that the conclusion does not have to be that time depends upon the human soul, for there might be

non-human souls that remember, perhaps even a world soul. Further, the utter inadequacy of human memory suggests that the past must have much more reality than its mere status in that memory. We remember that much occurred which we do not remember. Thus *either* the reality of the past transcends memory altogether, *or* there is a transcendent form of memory in which the past as remembered is the whole of what actually occurred. If he had faced this dilemma, the author might have had more hesitation about dismissing the Bergson-Whitehead theory according to which the past has full actuality in the divine memory, and unless he can refute this theory, his whole argument falls. The argument is that the present is always becoming past, hence becoming non-existent, so that no real good is ever established unless it be outside of time altogether. But by what right do we assume that human memory is the measure of all memory, that because we cannot retain the past in its fullness no mind could do so? As well argue that because we cannot have knowledge unmixed with error omniscience is impossible. Just as the world soul knows all of the present, whereas we know but a fragment, so it preserves in its full quality all of the past, whereas we preserve but a handful of images, mostly pale or vague.

However, we are told that modern man (who according to the author is elsewhere largely mistaken) cannot accept a world soul, because for him deity is cause of the world, not the world, and because he has been taught to reject any intermediary between himself and God. But why should not God be both the cause of the world and the world? Each of us is in some measure the cause of his own experiences, so far as they are freely chosen and created. Yet, also, each of us is, in his present actuality, his present experience. Now God is supposed to know and love the world he creates. How can it be doubted that to create what one knows and loves is very literally to create part of oneself? And the total state of God as knowing and loving his de facto creation would be analogous to the state of a man in relation to his body, since the most intimate object of knowledge and concern to each man is his own body, and God's relation to the world is direct and unmediated, thus as intimate as possible. So there is no opposition between the ideas of creator and of world soul. Nor has Plato's argument been refuted, that an animate organism is superior to an inanimate, so that if God had not created a world soul he would have created something inferior, even as

created things go. All that Plato apparently did not see is that the creating and created Gods might be the same divine being in diverse aspects or stages, and thus the world soul would not be between God and the human mind, but would be just God as related in knowledge and love to the creatures.

Our learned author suggests that the Greek view of time was cyclical, whereas we know religiously that each event is unique and unrepeatable. But surely it is the Bergsonian argument, if any, which provides the anti-cyclical view with its ultimate credentials. If event A^1 remembers event A, it cannot simply duplicate it, for A did not remember itself. Yet the author complains that Bergson and Whitehead are falling back into the Greek view, since they repeat its panpsychic tendency. He seems not to see that the Greek view here was inconsistent, since the cyclical emphasis rests upon observation of spatial movements, rather than upon the ultimate psychical interpretation of such movements. If moving bodies remember, they cannot forever move in the same way, for such monotonous repetition is deadly to the mind. Of course Augustine was right in tracing time to a "stratum of man's existence which is different from the world," if one means the world as appearing on the surface of common sense, but if one means the world as interpreted by a sufficiently careful panpsychism, then I see nothing in Augustine to justify the statement. Again, when Dr. Frank says that no one of us would in sober earnest regard the universe as a living and conscious being, as God, he elicits the reply: "Speak for yourself. You are accusing a number of persons of lack of sobriety for no apparent reason other than your failing to agree with them." In addition, the world is only in a certain aspect and sense identical with God according to the Bergsonian-Whiteheadian view (which was also that of Fechner); in other senses and aspects God and the world can be distinguished.

A curious argument offered is that the very emphasis upon temporal reality, in Whitehead and others, "betrays to what small extent he is actually absorbed in it . . ." By this method of reasoning, a man can be shown to think secondary whatever he asserts is primary. And to clinch the point, the author quotes Whitehead's "the insistent craving, that zest for existence be refreshed by the ever-present unfading importance of our immediate actions which perish and yet live forevermore." Of course Whitehead is not absorbed in the mere passing of events taken sensorily, scientifically, and artistically; he wishes to add the religious

realization that units of experience which, for our awareness, sink into unreality the next moment nevertheless do not lose their reality objectively, but are enjoyed forevermore by deity. How is this to be twisted to make Whitehead "betray" that he really longs for the merely timeless deity of tradition?

Let us consider that deity for a moment. If God timelessly knows all events, then as content of his knowledge events do not come out of or go into an abyss of non-being, but rather, as factors in something purely immutable and without becoming, they simply are. This solves the problem of time as destruction, but unfortunately it renders insoluble the problem of time as creation, and therefore makes nonsense of time itself, since "time is creation or nothing." (Bergson.) Thus traditional theism and atheism are alike in that they have no reasonable interpretation to give for time, none that shows how action can accomplish anything. It is the destruction of experiences, not their creation as real novelties, real additions to whatever there may be that is eternal, that we need to be saved from. Atheism can do nothing about the destruction, but traditional theism can deny it only if, in the same breath, it denies the creation, and therewith all raison d'être for the creatures. It removes both the becoming and the unbecoming of events. Whitehead allows events really to become, and also really to remain as having become. Never can they unbecome. Dr. Frank is saying either that events really unbecome, or that they do not really become. Either way, has he an intelligible doctrine of time?

We are told that our conception of God must be negative, since he transcends all our conceptions. I suggest that the "since" is a nonsequitur. The conception that God remembers all of the past, for example, is positive, but it is nonetheless clear that such a memory transcends our understanding. We can say the words "all of the past," and we mean something by them, but obviously we have no distinct and adequate image of what is meant. Be the past beginningless or with a beginning, we are baffled by the conception of a complete consciousness of that past. (I am not saying Kant's antinomy is valid; I think it is not.) If it is mystery we seek, then there is no slightest need to look "beyond space and time." Whitehead said once (I quote from memory): "It is impossible to contemplate time without an overwhelming emotion because of the limitations of human intelligence." Here, I suggest, is true, original piety, first hand, and not the echo of an echo. It is the temporal

that baffles and eludes us. Thus, what is the present? Is it a specious present of finite span, or of infinitesimal span (Peirce), or a mere mathematical instant? Whitehead's "epochal theory" is designed to deal with this problem. But a new one arises, concerning the various specious presents of diverse lengths, including the divine present, how they are interrelated, and how there can be a divine present in view of the denial of cosmic simultaneity in relativity physics. Men have argued that the paradoxes of time compel us to view ultimate reality as non-temporal, but this is a little disingenuous, considering the obvious and scarcely denied paradoxes (downright contradictions, I hold) of the alleged concept of an immutable actuality. Doubtless God transcends us, but why should he not do so by being what we *infinitely* are not, that is, really *adequate* to time, temporal in the uniquely ultimate and complete sense of experiencing *all* change in its fullness, as thus far occurrent, and of being destined to so experience whatever change may in future occur?

The author stresses the point that concepts as applied to God are analogical, and he thinks that "modern" philosophers have lost this insight. It is true that they have neglected the *term* "analogy"—regrettably so, I think. But, in the first place, who, if not Bergson and Whitehead, have seen the limitations of literal meanings? It is a favorite theme of both authors. Furthermore, those who interpret all reality as temporal do not mean that temporality is just the same thing in us and in God. Far from it. The sense in which we intuit a past and a future is radically other than the sense in which God does so, just as ascribing spatiality to God does not mean that he is in space in the same manner as men and mountains. God is equally effective everywhere and always, he is not *localized* in spatio-temporal reality, but possesses and is it in toto. Yet he has a future, because future events are non-actual, they are potencies for further actualization and only *as* potencies are included in the total reality. God indeed has a future *infinitely more* than do we, who in a short time will be entirely in the past. God will never be entirely in the past, hence he is the futuristic being par excellence and in a sense which is only analogous to our futurity. Similarly, he belongs in a unique sense to the past, since he is the only being who was operative in *all* the past. It is significant that Dr. Frank assigns three possible meanings to eternal, but omits the one which contemporary metaphysics indicates as the fundamental one, that of which all others are

abstracted aspects. According to this neglected view, God's eternity is his absolute possession of all actual events, all events that have occurred or are occurring, and his certainty of possessing additional events, whichever may occur, in the no matter how remote future. Eternity in the sense of mere immutability is merely the abstract identity of basic character which God always has, no matter what events he experiences—analogous to the self-identity which I will have (if I survive) *whether or not* I go next year to New York for a visit, or which I would have had even had I not visited New York some years ago.

It is only fair to comment upon the wide learning, not only in ancient but even in recent authors, which this book exhibits. It well represents the extreme conservative position (if one allows Kant a moderate place in that position) in philosophical theology. Many valuable ancient insights are expressed, alas often associated with what many of us must view as ancient errors. And, with all the contemporary references, the author does not really know the possibilities which the metaphysics of religion has recently shown to be available for combining piety with philosophical understanding.

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Naturalism and The Human Spirit. Edited by YERVANT H. KRIKORIAN. (Number Eight of the Columbia Studies in Philosophy.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. x, 397 pp. $4.50.

Besides the first chapter by John Dewey, this volume brings together fourteen essays by authors who were properly reckoned among "the younger generation" in philosophy before World War II. They are presented together as essays in "contemporary naturalism," a mode of philosophy which emerged in America with Dewey and others of his generation.

Most of these essays are technical and professional in their statement and appeal. Much of their meaning is inaccessible to those who are inexpert in recent philosophical literature. Yet indirectly the importance of this volume extends far beyond the guild of philosophers, and can truly claim to be universal. Why is this so? It is because these writers are aiming to further a naturalistic discipline of the mind, which will have immense consequences if it does prevail.

This discipline of mind is that of modern scientific method conceived

as indefinitely extensible. Its core is the collaborative experimental discovery and determination of facts, and the growth of a community of understanding and control in terms of increasingly definite and effective interpretive concepts tested in reference always to specific and available empirical evidence. "Contemporary naturalism" believes that this is the great common highway to truth, and indeed the only reliable road. It also believes that by intelligent invention this road can be extended into every field. It recognizes no insuperable barriers, nor impassable gulfs between body and mind, nature and spirit, fact and value, man and a "wholly other." As H. T. Costello puts it: "There are many mansions in the great house of the world and few high fences." Perhaps some of the fences actually encountered are pretty high and stout, but, in any case, these contemporary naturalists have the faith that scientific method can find out how to cross them. And so in this volume, we find the editor, Y. H. Krikorian, pointing out that the way is not barred into those reaches of mind commonly called "introspective." We find E. W. Strong analyzing very keenly the materials and resources of science in problems of historical knowledge, while G. Boas does the same in the special field of the history of philosophy. S. P. Lamprecht discusses the implications of naturalism for religion; E. Vivas undertakes to show the meaning of "a natural history of the aesthetic transaction"; and A. Edel seeks to further naturalistic ethics by analysis of "choice," as the central "existential material to which ethics most systematically refers." It will be recognized that these are all domains in which it is still quite common to question whether the use of scientific method is appropriate and effective.

But if "contemporary naturalism" stands for "a continuity of analysis" (as Thelma Z. Lavine phrases it), its proponents in this volume also seek to make clear that it does not undertake to pre-judge what such analysis will find. They claim to pursue the logic of their ways without prior ontological commitments. They insist that "contemporary naturalism" is not committed to any form of "reductionism." Specifically, they disavow that it is trying to reduce the world to matter and motion, after the manner of classic materialism.[1] W. R. Dennes,

1. Despite this disavowal the position has been critized by W. H. Sheldon as being materialism pure and simple. (See *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLII, No. 10. And this criticism has called forth an extensive reply. (See the same *Journal*, Vol. XLII, No. 19.)

the only one of the group who here undertakes to write on "the categories of naturalism," finds the basic ones for "contemporary naturalism" to be "events," "qualities," and "relations." But he also reiterates that this tells us nothing about the range of what may be discovered in a world of "qualitied related events." "The program of dealing with all entities as qualitied related events," he says, "does not of itself determine in any respect the nature of anything." The value of these basic categories is simply that, in terms of them, scientific knowledge need not "be restricted by its method to any limited field of subject-matter—to the exclusion, let us say of the processes called history and the fine arts."

There do seem to be differences of opinion, however, among these writers as to whether a naturalistic program of discovery might come across God or not. These differences flow in part, of course, from the by now notorious diversity in the use of that term. Thus, H. T. Costello says roundly: "Even the new naturalism has at least one reductionist or liquidationist thesis: There is no 'super-natural.' God and immortality are myths." Yet for such naturalists as accept the basic categories suggested by W. R. Dennes, there would seem to be no reason for "liquidating" the possible discovery of divinity or immortality, if they can be identified in terms of "qualitied related events." This seems also to be the conclusion of S. P. Lamprecht in his essay on "Naturalism and Religion." However, he throws his emphasis strongly on the point that naturalists "will probably reject the arguments for the existence of God as failing in empirical warrant. Though God may exist, the arguments are all weak and evidence is lacking." He continues:

> Naturalism is certainly no more concerned to disprove the existence of God than to disprove the existence of another planet in the solar system. But as naturalism would rebel against the vain instructions that we human beings set our clocks by the movements of an undiscovered planet, so it rebels against the claim that life ought to be centered in and guided by divine will or providence. Until and unless the existence of God is shown by empirical evidence to be probable, it is not an article by which human values and human ideals may be significantly determined or advanced or enforced.

While passing these strictures upon classic and liberal theologies, Lamprecht has chosen his subject, not merely to be iconoclastic, but because he wishes (like Santayana) to bring within the orbit of naturalism a recognition of the great human importance of "the religious life. . .

taken to mean a life in which multiple interests and diverse values are brought into effective and organic unity through central allegiance to some integrating ideal." He pleads, moreover, for the cultivation of such a life without bigotry and with respect for diversity, saying:

> There ought to be no expectation or even desire to formulate a universally acceptable religion. This does not mean that religion is a matter of merely subjective taste. It means that as complex a being as man and as intricate a career as human life can hardly be supposed to have one single best way of being organized. . . . The final religion is as absurd a dream as the final poem or the final symphony. The religious quest must forever remain a piece of "unfinished business" for openminded and sensitive men.

Though these contemporary naturalists are not out to deny the existence of anything for which evidence may conceivably be found, their doubts certainly extend to many of the realities dear to older philosophies as well as theologies. Continuity of analysis does not mean for them that there is an orderly cosmos with a tidy unity of meaning. The unities of meaning that make the universe one intelligible whole for idealistic philosophies, are all of them suspect, because they have to be defended on non-empirical grounds. Even Spinoza's non-teleological doctrine of the infinite unity of Nature is conspicuously absent from this volume. Odd though it may sound, this "contemporary naturalism" is not putting forward any particular doctrine of Nature. Thus, H. T. Costello is not presenting any doctrine, but only telling how it "seems" to him, when he writes:

> To Woodbridge, as to some of the other naturalistic philosophers, "Nature" carries a connotation of something very solid and real, an emotional unification of all things. Toward Nature they feel a natural piety, as toward the great Mother of us all. For myself, I do not feel that piety, whether expressed by a Marcus Aurelius or a Woodbridge. To me Nature seems rather a collective name for quite a mess of miscellaneous stuff.

The "supernaturalism" to which "contemporary naturalism" stands irreconcilably opposed is not, then, to be defined in terms of any particular world-view. Its essence is the exaltation above scientific knowledge of a Truth proclaimed on the basis of "revelation, mystic insight, rational self-evidence, hypnotic leadership," intuition, tradition, etc. From this point of view even so critical and cautious an ontologist as Immanuel Kant can be attacked as a "supernaturalist," because of the dualism of method in the fields of fact and of value which gathered

weight from him. Indeed, there is a sense in which the most profound problem for "contemporary naturalism" is still the problem of the relation between science and practice, posed by Kant but solved by him in a dubious way. Hence J. H. Randall Jr., in his brilliant summary chapter on "The nature of naturalism," can say that because "Kant still left a chasm between the realm of nature, science, and 'pure reason', and man's moral, religious, and artistic activities—his thought remains the classic modern expression of a thoroughgoing dualism and supernaturalism."

It is clear that all these contemporary naturalists are concerned to effect the disappearance of this "chasm" between science and man's other activities. That, I take it, is the point of the book's general title, *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, to assert the claim that there are no important interests of the human spirit beyond the reach of a naturalistic approach and of mature scientific collaboration. This is the basic common message of these authors, and there is nothing in philosophy today of greater significance. But for the sake of this message, as well as for the human spirit's sake, it is of equal importance that such a claim for the possibilities of science be viewed in true and just relation to the full character of man's situation. It is important to remember that however successful and pervasive scientific habits of mind may become, they will always remain an aspect rather than the whole of man's more complex cultural enterprise. This point is so obvious, one can hardly believe it is being overlooked by J. H. Randall Jr. when he writes that men "can live by the carefully built-up body of procedures of testing and verifying beliefs which forms the scientific enterprise." Surely men live—and probably always will—by personal and institutional ways that embody not only scientific procedures but patterns of tradition, conjecture, emotion, ambition, inspiration, faith, and adopted policy.

Few philosophers have given more central emphasis than John Dewey to the need of seeing and understanding the scientific enterprise within its larger context of human activity and purpose as shaped by all cultural conditions. And in this volume the most interesting and instructive historical essay by H. A. Larrabee on "Naturalism in America" also drives this point home. So do the critical and polemic essays by Dewey himself and by S. Hook on "Naturalism and Democracy." From these three essays, which cite many examples of non-naturalistic utterances, one can scarcely come away impressed by the latter as resting upon ways

of knowing. At the same time, one can not avoid realizing the ardent and persistent attachment of individuals and groups to many of the values and presumed values they cherish with or without benefit of scientific reason. And one can hardly fail to note the tremendous appeal of non-naturalistic philosophies as interpretations and justifications of such attachments.

A possible comment of naturalists upon this fact is the one made by Santayana in regarding the spiritual function of naturalism to be "disintoxication" from too great attachment to values.[2] But the writers in this book, indebted though many of them are to Santayana, do not in the main follow him along this line. At most one could say that the scientific discipline they associate with naturalism promises an astringent effect upon soft parts of the mind. They do not want to be detached from values, but they do want to be hard-headed in their estimate and pursuit of them. This temper, plus the great impact of scientific progress on modern philosophy, causes them to be primarily occupied from first to last with the extension of reliable ways of knowing. While they avow interest also in ways of living, indeed in every field germane to the human spirit, their main business seems to be to lay down scientific roads and bridges everywhere. They pursue this with an impressive conscientiousness. In the nature of the case, it is altogether in keeping that the finest, technical contribution to the volume is probably E. Nagel's essay on implications of scientific method for logical theory, called "Logic without Ontology."

The way to knowledge of norms and values is necessarily a topic of importance in most of the essays, and J. H. Randall Jr., without going into detail, agrees with Thelma Z. Lavine that naturalistic methods can arrive at values that are "functionally absolute." In a flavorful essay on "The Unnatural," H. W. Schneider more definitely than any of his associates takes the view that "nature is a norm" in its *energeia*, its fruitful "working." He adds, however, that "naturalistic norms," so grounded, are not "statistical," nor "ideal," nor "categorical imperatives for human life." There are also "unnatural values" which "are good for unnatural ends." Take your choice and take the consequences. Thelma Z. Lavine develops the important theme that sociological analysis can help to render the knowledge of cognitive and other norms less scho-

2. Cf. his essay on *Platonism and the spiritual life*, 1927.

lastic, more accurate, and more responsible to human needs. To me it is interesting that she chose to write on "Naturalism and the Sociological Analysis of Knowledge," instead of on the significance which naturalism and a still broader sociological analysis of meaning might have for each other.

The relations between science and the other enterprises of culture, in which there is a large non-cognitive element, require much more sustained and cosmopolitan consideration than they receive in this volume. It seems to me that men, and even philosophers, can be "naturalists" pure and simple, in the sense defined here, only if they do seek a very real detachment or at least limitation in the pursuit of values. If they seek any large and productive attachment to values of the human spirit, they must become naturalists with further special affiliations, e.g., perhaps naturalistic democrats, or naturalistic communists, naturalistic Confucians, Christians, or humanists, or naturalistic something else. If they are genuine naturalists, in the sense of this volume, they will pursue these affiliations, in each case, with particular care to cultivate the functions that scientific criticism and discovery can perform for the increase of enlightenment and power. What "contemporary naturalism" stands for is an inestimably great cultural force. The variety of its possible affiliations as well as the actual achievements of this force both testify to that. "Contemporary naturalism," however, should not make the mistake, so frequently made by other cultural powers, of estimating itself as the one true catholicism. There is no such thing. Naturalism can not be this, not so much because there are regions into which science can not go, but because, even if science goes everywhere, it can never be the whole of life or all of its virtue. In this volume no great regard is paid to this matter of cultural affiliations; the question of the influence of different contexts upon naturalism and vice versa seems to have been avoided or taken for granted. "Contemporary naturalism" in this way may perhaps enjoy a more universal and self-contained appearance. Yet despite this appearance, or perhaps just because of it, one can not help feeling provincial limitations of the U.S.A. today in this book. At this date it is rather striking to note that only John Dewey, in all these essays, so much as mentions by a phrase the relation of "naturalism" to conditions beyond the familiar "western world" in Asia and Africa.

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The Moral Theory of Evolutionary Naturalism. By WILLIAM S. QUILLIAN, JR. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945. xiv, 154 pp. $3.00.

This volume, which is the seventeenth publication of the Yale Studies in Religious Education, offers an exposition and criticism "of the ethical theory of Evolutionary Naturalism, with particular attention to the theory's exclusion of religious and metaphysical considerations" (p. 21).

"The naturalistic interest in ethics was not new with the nineteenth century evolutionary moralists" (p. 12), and Professor Quillian traces the course of ethical naturalism from Democritus through Epicurus to Thomas Hobbes, and on to Bentham and John Stuart Mill. But the evolutionary hypothesis changed the direction of ethical naturalism. "Before the application of the theory of evolution to the understanding of man, naturalistic ethical theory was commonly worked out in dependence upon an analysis of the impulses and the activity of the individual man" (p. 13). "However, the new knowledge of man and of his place in the universe opened up by the demonstration of evolution as a fundamental principle in nature, seemed to be just what was needed for a genuinely scientific ethics," and, according to Dr. Quillian, moral theories which lay claim to such scientific status are to be attacked in a different way from their predecessors. Specifically he offers exposition and criticism of the theories of Charles Darwin, W. K. Clifford, Leslie Stephen, Herbert Spencer, and Jean Marie Guyau.

Unfortunately this selection of authors—interesting and important as their contributions are—is hardly a full offering or even a fair sampling of nineteenth century doctrines of "evolutionary naturalism," and the unfairness is accentuated by the rather disproportionate emphasis given to the teachings of Herbert Spencer. Among the Spencerian doctrines from which some of Dr. Quillian's other evolutionary naturalists themselves dissent are Spencer's "explanation of the sense of duty in terms of 'the cerebral vestige of our ancestors' alarms' " (p. 93), and his theory "that the stage reached by the natural evolution of conduct, on the one hand, and the ethical value of conduct, on the other, are measured in exactly the same way" (p. 51).

According to Dr. Quillian, "The crucial point in the moral theory of Evolutionary Naturalism is the transition from a purely descriptive account of the development of moral phenomena to a normative interpretation of morality. Upon the validity of this transition depends the

success of the attempt made by this school of philosophy to develop a non-religious theory of morality.... That the transition from a naturalistic description to a normative interpretation of morality has been made illegitimately" is the thesis of Dr. Quillian's book.

Though he recognizes that Spencer's crude identification of "the natural evolution of conduct" with the "ethical value of conduct" involves a proposition the naïveté of which could not be duplicated in the subtle thought of W. K. Clifford or the reflective insight of J. M. Guyau, Dr. Quillian fails to state explicitly that Spencer's view is not shared by some of the theorists of evolutionary naturalism listed above and that it is repudiated by others. He does consider the writings of T. H. Huxley, L. T. Hobhouse, Westermarck, and Nietzsche and himself makes evident, by detailed quotation, that Huxley devoted a large part of his essay on "Evolution and Ethics" to careful refutation of what Dr. Quillian now designates "*the* moral theory of evolutionary naturalism" (italics mine). Since Huxley was as much of an "evolutionary naturalist" as any man, it is strange that his moral theories do not give pause to Dr. Quillian's thesis. A detailed consideration of Nietzsche's teachings might have produced not a pause, but a halt.

Fundamentally, there is throughout this study a failure to use such terms as "naturalistic," "scientific," or "evolutionary" with careful or critical discrimination of significant differences. This is particularly noteworthy, since Dr. Quillian accuses his "evolutionary naturalists" of holding "that a religious ethics is immoral and undesirable" (p. 113, ff.) because they fail to note significant distinctions in religion and religious life.

A more modest title would at least have avoided the implication that this book would give adequate consideration to varieties of "evolutionary naturalists" included in the Bibliography. The omission there of Romanes' *Darwin and After Darwin* may be remarked. The addition of the chapter on Darwin in Jacques Barzun's *Darwin, Marx and Wagner* would direct readers to another interpretation of Darwinism, as would the title essay in John Dewey's *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and other Essays*. The latter would furthermore provide a key to a contemporary "evolutionary naturalism."

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After Materialism—What?—The Reconciliation of Science and Religion: A New Interpretation of Truth. By Sir Richard Clifford Tute, New York: E. P. Dutton & co., 1945. 222 pp. $3.00.

Often the only way to review a book is to dig down between the words and sentences, the concepts and presuppositions, of the author and do, in a different way, what he has done in his exposition: namely, disclose from the same facts another point of view. Running through the treatment of the subject in this book are certain assumptions and a bias which discount or exalt everything the author says. It is not a scientific treatise, but a rhapsodic argument. The author states that the concept of space-time has lifted science out of the realm of reason and ratiocination to a super-physical plane, where the truth concerning the nature of the universe can only be intuited or apprehended by some form of mystic experience. He says:

We know that the universe is not what we perceive it to be (p. 181).

We never see anything as it is (p. 183).

The existence of ordinary discrete things is an illusion (p. 54).

The true causes, which lie in the interaction of four dimensional personalities, are never apparent. They can never be dealt with by our reasoning apparatus. They can be perceived only by intuition (p. 73).

Life is the only real existence (p. 65).

The universe of life is the one and only real universe (p. 207).

Apart from life, we know of nothing which can be regarded as pure existence (p. 78).

The ultimate constituents of the universe are lives, and these lives must be regarded as personalities. The unit personalities are the electrons, protons, and photons (p. 66-67).

What we see as motion and interaction must in their real aspect be the operation of personalities on other personalities (p. 69). The universe is a vast concourse of personalities (p. 49).

There are facts of life which cannot be weighed or measured, and with which, in consequence, science cannot deal. Life is such a fact (p. 64).

Three-dimensional reason cannot be applied satisfactorily to a four-dimensional continuum in which the reality behind sensory experience has its being (p. 68).

On scientific principles reality is not of this world. . . . What that reality is like neither reason nor science can tell us (p. 34).

Both language and reason have been evolved to enable us to deal with our physical surroundings. Beyond those surroundings both are meaningless (p. 208).

Science has become transcendental from the base up. It is no longer based on observable facts (p. 106).

The space-time continuum is a continuum in which both form and movement are non-existent, being replaced by energies and activities, of which the human mind can form no picture. The scientist is as much bound to assume the existence of this "real" continuum as the Christian is to believe in the existence of the Kingdom of Heaven. They may be one and the same thing. They almost certainly are (pp. 50-51).

Science is now just as much a mystic adventure as the Christian life, and for the same reason. That reason is that the basis of all things, whether material or immaterial, is mystical (pp. 199).

The question: After Spiritualism—What? is as relevant (or irrelevant) as the question: After Materialism—What? There is no evidence, so far, of the existence of either the matter of the materialist or the spirit of the spiritualist. All a scientific philosophy can tell us today is that reality is a process, that the universe is a vast system of activities, changes, transformations, the uniformities and variations of which are only imperfectly registered in what we call the laws of nature. Because science has discarded the concept of matter is no reason for supposing it now accepts the concept of spirit. In the paradoxical situation in which science finds itself, with matter dissolving into curves and waves of probability, laws into statistical averages, and entities into mass phenomena, is it likely that its methodology would turn to even more obscure and indefinable concepts such as life, consciousness, will, purpose, personality, for clarification of its difficulties?

It is true that modern science has refuted the old materialism, but it is still naturalistic. The idea that science is becoming mystical because it has discarded the traditional concept of matter, postulates the relativity of all acts, objects and events, employs a four-dimensional hypothesis to explain the basic facts of the universe—the idea that, because of such considerations, science is abandoning logical procedure and substituting a thalamic total response for the discriminative analysis by the cortex, indicates a basic misconception of the nature of scientific method. Mysticism is a total response to the universe, primarily emotional. Science is a discriminative response, primarily intellectual. Both are important, but they are different. If by materialism is meant merely what today is meant by naturalism, which includes not only nature but human nature, and therefore religion, as phases of natural phenomena, then there is no necessary conflict between science and religion. But if by materialism is meant a restricted interpretation of natural phenomena in terms of matter, motion, energy, or even in terms of events, change, evolution (which

may be called primary natural processes), leaving out those derivative but equally important facts of selfhood, awareness, social-mindedness and co-operation, characteristic of the human-natural, then any attempt to state a comprehensive philosophy would find materialism inadequate, since it would fail to do justice, not only to the phenomena of religion but other human value situations as well.

An empirical naturalism deals with facts—facts of any sort, quality or relationships. These facts need not be directly perceptible. They may lie beyond the range of our sense-perception—such as the sub-microscopic energies which illumine the light-bulb or operate the radio—but science possesses adequate evidence of their existence. The realms of which the supernaturalist and mystic speak may exist, but, in the absence of satisfactory evidence of their existence, the attitude of the man of science is one of suspended judgment. It is an error to state that science denies the existence of such realms, just as it is erroneous to identify science with materialism. Science is not a dogma. It is method. And method is investigative, exploratory, experimental, expansive, tentative, retrievable. The concept of matter as a substance has dissolved into a system of interrelated electro-magnetic radiations. These radiations are described in terms of units of energy (quanta) or in terms of waves or pulsations in a plenum (vibrations). Both are descriptions of a dynamic process rather than a static entity. In this respect matter, as conceived by modern physics, in certain aspects approximates the nature of that vague term "spirit" which also has always been regarded as immaterial (in the substance sense) and as dynamic rather than static in character. Were it not for its uncertified ethical and religious connotations, the word might readily be used to describe the modern concept of matter. But until its baggage-train of moral and mystical impedimenta is looked into, examined, and carefully assorted, science will probably leave the alluring word in its ethico-religious context. But to call science materialistic, because it declines to take over this word with its present obscure and ambiguous implications, is just another failure to understand the nature of scientific method.

Science, indeed any thinking and knowing, is the search for the What, the How, the Why of things, including our experience of those things. In the past both physics and metaphysics have stressed the What in this inquiry, calling it Reality—matter or spirit. But, in modern times, since the knowledge of the What presupposes a knowledge of the How,

physics has increasingly stressed the process, operation, changes, variations which take place in a world, the nature of which (i.e., the What, the reality, matter or spirit or whatever) is a problem deferred until more is known of How it operates. The Why, the cause, the ground or reason of things is likewise postponed. Being as an object of inquiry gives place to doing, not merely our own doing as human beings, but that totality of doing or activity we call nature. Reality as the problem of science, at least temporarily, gives place to a study of the processes, potential or kinetic, in a dynamic universe. Any genuine knowledge of the What and the Why, our theory of the nature of reality, its source (if such a question has meaning) and its raison d'être, in other words, goes back to a study of the world as we experience it—not only in our ordinary perception, but in those pre-arranged conditions of perception and inference we call the scientific technologies. We can answer the question as to what reality is (the What) only as we investigate what reality does (the How); and the answer to this question can be found only by the scientific method of checking and testing the activities of ceaseless change of which we form a part. The fact that certain of these activities are immediately perceptible (i.e., belong to the macroscopic world) and others are known only inferentially (i.e., belong to a sub-microscopic or extra-sensory world) is no reason for assuming that they differ fundamentally in character. On the surface, this difference registers merely the limitations of our sense-perception.

The results of our science to date suggest that the greater part of the processes which constitute, not only the environment in which we live, but our own natures as well, is still beyond our perception and not even inferentially known. Like a floating iceberg, nine tenths of all that we call the universe is beneath the threshold of our experience, but the presumption is that the glimpses we do get are a fair sample of what the whole is like. Science assumes that the experience we have of the universe, limited though it be, is a genuine insight into its nature. Of course, a sub-atomic physics and an Einsteinian relativity are rather cold impersonal glimpses, but as science moves forward to a biological, a psychological, and a sociological technology, there is every reason to believe that some day human nature itself will find its counterpart in a universe that produced us. Certainly such abstract concepts as matter or spirit are not going to help us in this inquiry.

Beneath, or rather within, the structure of ourselves and our environ-

ment science is finding that there is a substructure of activities far more complicated than was even dreamed of in a Newtonian physics. We no longer ask whether these activities are material or spiritual, for the concepts of matter and spirit have both been relegated to the methodological scrap-pile. A completely new approach is being made in terms of a dynamic system in which that electro-magnetic radiation we call light has a finite but invariable velocity, while everything else, including space, time, matter, mass, momentum, acceleration, location, stasis and kinesis are relativistic. It is a world of variables in which there is at least one center of stabilizing equilibrium. If what the physicist of today calls "action" and its unit called "h" are to be regarded as manifestations of a four-dimensional plenum, then electrons, protons, photons are parcels, packets, or quanta of such action, and they underlie or rather interpenetrate and sustain every object, event, and act in our macroscopic world. Until we have data to guide us, it is methodologically unsound to attribute traits or characteristics to these immanent energies beyond those our scientific investigations disclose. To say that everything is life, consciousness, personality is not a clarifying statement, since these are ambiguous obscure words—so much so that a scientific psychology has set them aside as confusing rather than informing, in its investigations.

Truth is certified knowledge, not fervently felt wish-thinking. Any "new interpretation of the truth" means a more adequate technique of certification, not a so-called higher kind of knowledge called intuition or revelation. It is an odd reaction to infer that the deepening mystery science has disclosed encompassing us must drive us back to an intuitive religious attitude. On the contrary, it is a stimulus to further scientific effort, new hypotheses, techniques, experiments. Since all scientific principles are of the nature of postulates, it is ridiculous to suppose that the increased difficulty and complexity of its problems will ever lead it to abandon its persistent methodical investigations. Science deals wth values as well as with facts, the difference being that, at the present time, the value sciences are imperfectly developed, whereas the factual sciences are far in advance, both as to techniques and results. It is just in this region of value situations that scientific method is most needed, instead of the vague intuitive and mystical methods, so called.

Of course, when we say that science deals with facts, this does not mean that the facts exist independently of our observation of them. The act of perception is a factor in the determination of the nature of the fact, as

well as the otherwise dynamic context in which the fact exists. There are no such things as independent facts. Facts are objects or events in relation to an observer. The observation or knowing is a factor in the fact known. A fact is the product of a situation or context in which the knowing plays a part in determining the nature of what is known. What we call the fact is what it is because of the point of view from which it is observed and because of the particular mode of observing it. And, as these both vary from one observation to another, the only way to arrive at a scientific statement of the nature of the fact is to agree upon conventional, and perhaps some experimentally controlled, mode of perception. The facts with which science deals are thus statistical averages which express the nature of the fact, not as an independent object (since no such object exists), but as a typical unit of a mass phenomena investigation. As Dewey and Bentley point out (*Journal of Philosophy,* XLII [1945] "A Terminology for Knowings and Knowns," pp. 231-37);

> the activity by which it is identified and the *what* that is identified are both required, and are required in such a way that each is taken along with the other, and in no sense as separable.

That is,

> knowledge requires and includes both knowings and knowns. . . . Anything named "fact" is such both with respect to the knowing operation and with respect to that which is known. . . . The object observed is as much a part of the operation as is the observing organism.
>
> Fact, in our terminology, is not limited to what any one man knows, nor to what is known to any one human grouping, nor to any one span of time such as our own day and age. On the designatory side in our project of research it has the full range and spread which . . . it has on the event side, with all the futures and the pasts, the betters and the poorers, comprised as they come. In our belief the Newtonian era has settled the status of fact definitely in this way for our generation of research, at the least. First, Newtonian mechanics rose in the shelter of its glorified absolutes to credal strength. Then at the hands of Faraday, Clerk-maxwell, and Einstein, it lost its absolutes, lost its credal claims, and emerged chastened and improved. It gained thus the high rating of a magnificent approximation as compared with its earlier trivial self-rating as eternal certainty. The coming years—fifty, or a thousand, whatever it takes—remain quite free for change; any intelligent voice will say this—the trouble is to get ears to hear. Our new assurance is better than the old assurance. The full knowledge—knowing and the known—event and designation—go forward together. Eventuation is observed. Accept this in principle, and not merely as a casual comment on an accidental happening—you then have before you

what our terminology recognizes when it places Fact-in-growth as sound enough base for research with no need to bother over minuscular mentals or crepuscular reals alleged to be responsible for it.

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Humanism and Human Dignity. By Luther Winfield Stalnaker. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945. 58 pp. $1.00.

Mr. Stalnaker offers a comprehensive and illuminating criticism of absolutism from the humanistic standpoint. He not only presents in a clear and pungent manner, many of the usual indictments against absolutism, but also contends that the precepts of the absolutists themselves, if followed out logically, should result in the humanistic position.

F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, and Josiah Royce are taken as representatives of absolutism and their respective philosophies are subjected to a rather detailed criticism.

Briefly, the general absolutistic thesis maintains that ultimate reality is a unitary whole, analagous to the thought process which resolves its heterogenious concepts into a rational meaningful completion. However, since there is no temporal process in the absolute, it is an already eternally completed resolution of all conflicting forces.

In such a closed system, time, freedom, and evil are "finite modes," or appearances, because of the partial views manifested to our limited minds. They have, from the Absolute's point of view, no real existence. All parts of the world of experience are finite microcosms, manifesting the features of the whole. The moral consciousness is seen as man's most significant aspect and his point of contact with the Absolute.

Stalnaker attacks the erroneous assumption of the absolutists in regard to the thought processes upon which the Absolute is patterned. A careful view of these thought processes reveals no such completion as the absolutists maintain, rather, "The human mind under impulsion of its purposes, has no experience of arriving at a conclusive reality" (p. 3). It is ever pressing onward to find new conflicts and diversities in wider horizons. Thus, if it is to be modeled on this thought basis, the Absolute cannot be any final completion.

To go on to criticize the ultimate results of the absolutistic position, Stalnaker declares vehemently, "The entire meaning of human effort

is annulled, because there is no evil for man to overcome, no time in which to strive, no freedom with which to wage the battle" (p. 1).

Humanism, on the other hand, champions man rather than the cosmos. For the humanist, the world must be one which is most intelligible to man, based on all his various experiences, especially one "Which will do justice to . . . the moral consciousness: i.e., our uncertainties, our regrets, our strivings for the good" (p. 37). Such a world will maintain a genuine indeterminateness; it will be a "loose-jointed" pluralistic world. The Good is the supreme authority, and any God will be the all good theistic God, fellow striver, rather than the paradoxical all good all powerful Absolute.

We are the only Absolute in our ability to "rise to the challenge of (our) own ascendent capacities to overcome obstructions" and thus to be "the ultimate instrument of (our) own salvation—why suggest an Absolute that is over or above us, since we, so far as we live 'a life at all,' are doing these very things" (p. 36).

Finally, no completed metaphysic, such as absolutism maintains, is possible for a world built on the precarious and adventurous human-experience.

Stalnaker goes into a detailed analysis of the absolutistic theories of time, evil, and freedom in which he points out their logical discrepancies, showing that many of their contentions contain the very germs of humanism. According to the absolutists, time has no place in the whole: "If progress were ultimately real to infinity the gates would be closed against the very goal of progress, perfection" (p. 10).

Bosanquet points to the intent and the end, rather than the process, as significant in our own temporal experiences, thus it is the resolution, the end which is real and the character of the Absolute. When he maintains the ends or intents as the real character of the Absolute, this involves at least a logical process which admits of succession as much as any temporal process.

Royce takes his stand on the psychological feeling of dissatisfaction as the experience of every temporal being, and argues that only the eternal can guarantee the predominance of the good. The time-order is but a mode of interpretation and an inseparable condition of moral acts.

Royce's dissatisfaction argument is shattered in two steps. First, we realize that dissatisfaction is rather the result of "the limitations of our

universe—the incapacity of our own minds" (p. 15). Second, when we are asked, "How there could be any sentient whole with a sense of its timelessness—any satisfactory quenching of dissatisfaction in an eternal unity of meaning if it were not for the equally necessary experience of time-process" (p. 13).

Stalnaker shows that all absolutists recognize the experience of succession, and contends that they should accord it as vital a place as have the humanists. This does not mean they must admit of any uniform rate of time but merely a principle of succession.

Finally, throughout, the absolutists have emphasized the fact of the Absolute's appearance in its finite centers. If this is the case, then "Any Ultimate Being that is so engaged in transmuting its own constituents is itself in a process of change—involved in Time series" (p. 20).

Evil is ascribed by the absolutists to a false abstraction from the whole, a partial view, and especially to our type of moral consciousness and its values. The Absolute has all these factors of evil present, but resolved in a union which cancels the defects, "Ignorance, striving defeat . . . is present from the Absolute point of view, but is also seen . . . with the solution of problems, attainment of goals, the over-coming of defeats" (p. 27).

Stalnaker points out that, inasmuch as evil is the accompaniment of our moral consciousness, it must be as ultimate as the moral consciousness which is, he insists, the "primary unit of intelligibility for us." Evil he holds, is not of a different stuff, but an "obstructing attitude." No matter how one looks at it, "a given evil might be conquered, the fact remains that it was irrevocably that evil" (p. 29). Furthermore, no matter to what heights we climb, we have the possibilities of evil always with us, meeting new contrasts and conflicts on higher planes. Indeed, he declares, "pain and evil are constituents in the highest experience" (p. 32).

Any Absolute that does not admit of this evil that permeates all our experience is completely unintelligible: "It is no better position than the God who moves in utterly mysterious and capricious ways his 'wonders to perform' " (p. 31).

Under the category of freedom, the absolutists all admit that the only freedom consists in "willing the Universal." Royce gives us more leeway: our freedom consists in loyalty to a cause and we construct our cause, but

again, in this we are willing the universal. The only real freedom we have is "freedom to hold attention, or to forget by inattention an Ought already present to one's finite consciousness" (p. 43).

Stalnaker repeats the cry of all humanists that if we have no freedom, goods or values can mean nothing to us. In a more original vein, he points out that the absolutists have recognized the finite individual as a center expressing the real, as such, then, it would seem that it "must have some kind of nature" (p. 44). Being as generous as possible to the absolutists, he declares, "For an agent to *know* that he is carrying out the will of another. . . argues that he must be possed of an appreciable degree of self-determination" (p. 45). An act of appreciation itself admits of another will outside its object.

More positively, Stalnaker insists that all the notions upon which the absolutists base their claims, are in the end, irrevocably our experiences. "Our Transcendent experience whereby we brand our finite selves as imperfect after all must still be our experience. . . (thus) the ends are not ends in abstracto; they are our ends. . . . It is as if we were all creative artists" (pp. 45 ff.).

We do need a common unity transcending our individual purposes as the absolutists maintain, but to be intelligible it can be only a "meeting ground" made up of the general agreement of wills and purposes.

In view of all this discussion, Stalnaker concludes that, "The Absolute is a Humanistic product whose creators have forgotten its origin and remembered only the expanse between our expectation of it and our own indifferent success" (p. 34).

Stalnaker has not only made some very acute criticisms of absolutism, but has also shown an openminded appreciation of many of its appeals. We might, however, question a few points. Metaphysics as a valid enterprise seems to be ruled out. We do not want to insist that man turn all his energies to the dubious task of penetrating the "Real" to the neglect of the "Good," but surely the humanist should not deal a death blow, by branding it impossible, to something that has tempted and stirred the vision and imagination of man since man began!

Again, humanism can become subjective to the point of being pessimistic. If we make ourselves our own gods and place all our values in our own achievements, then our own paltry successes are the only things that count. Our failures and our defeated efforts have no ultimate

meaning or redemption outside of ourselves. Bosanquet speaks truly when he says, "Defeat and contradiction cannot constitute the really significant essence of even a finite being" (p. 24). Humanism itself cries out that "that which is most vital to our existence, to our understanding of our world, should rightly dictate the terms of its world" (p. 51), and man likes to think that there is outside himself something more enduring than even the theistic God, if it be only so general a principle as the Idea of the Good and the Beautiful. In the words of Frederick Woodbridge, "He will see things sub specie æternitatis even while time counts out his sands of life."

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BOOK NOTES

Problems of New Testament Translation. By E. J. Goodspeed. University of Chicago Press, 1945. xix, 215 pp. $2.50.

Dr. Goodspeed has rendered many distinguished services to New Testament scholarship in the course of his long and still fruitful career, but it is fairly safe to say that none of them will have as great continuing importance as his translation of the New Testament into English, "the American Translation." Not only is this translation one of the most widely used, it is also one of the most accurate and excellent. It is more than an achievement in the area of the "humanization of knowledge"; it is an enormously significant contribution to knowledge itself.

One's respect not only for this translation, but for all good modern translations of the New Testament, is bound to be increased by a reading of this latest book of Dr. Goodspeed. He takes us with him into his own study and shows us from the inside a small part of the translator's task. What problems does the translator face? With what tools does he work? What principles determine his choice between alternative possible English renderings? The author seeks to answer these questions, not systematically and abstractly, but by means of a discussion of one hundred concrete problems—which is certainly the most interesting, and perhaps the only possible, way to answer them. One is brought to see, in instance after instance, difficulties one had not suspected and to recognize how thorough and wide-ranging must be the scholarship which effectively deals with them.

There is no way of indicating in this review just what particular problems are discussed. Let it suffice to say that most of the more perplexing and controversial passages are treated. One may not always agree with Dr. Goodspeed's solutions; but one is made aware of the dimensions of the several illustrative problems, and this is the real purpose of the book.

If, as an admirer and constant user of the "new translations," especially Dr. Goodspeed's, I were asked to state what seems to me to be their most frequent fault, I should say it lies in the elimination of ambiguities in the original Greek. In one way, this greater clarity is obviously a virtue; but where the original Greek word or phrase has several possible meanings, there may be a question about the accuracy of a translation which settles definitely on one. This fault, if it be a fault, is perhaps unavoidable; certainly, with no serious experience as a translator, I would not be disposed to press the objection. I was reminded of this point by Dr. Goodspeed's sentence: "The fault of the first English versions was their word-for-word method, coupled with the evident conviction that the translator need not understand the text he was at work upon in order to translate it." Many examples of this fault can easily be found in the earlier versions—Dr. Goodspeed cites an amusing example from II Corinthians, in the American Standard Revision, "For verily that which hath been made glorious hath not been made glorious in this respect, by reason of the glory that surpasseth."

But the fact remains that the meaning of some passages in the Greek New Testament cannot be precisely defined: the writer meant either "this" or "that," or possibly something of both. In these cases the modern translator who gives a clear and precise English sense to the passage is perhaps guilty of the opposite and corresponding fault to that of the "word-for-word" translator. I repeat that this "fault" is probably inevitable in a translation which seeks to be clear and intelligible, as all good translations seek to be. The translator cannot help being also the interpreter.

One of the most useful features of this book is a brief glossary of King James terms. Dr. Goodspeed has written for the general reader, and in his usual lively and charming style.

JOHN KNOX

Commentarius Cantabrigiensis in Epistolas Pauli e Schola Petri Abaelardi. 3. In Epistolam ad Philippenses, ad Collossenses, I^{am} et II^{am} ad Thessalonicenses, I^{am} et II^{am} ad Timotheum, ad Titum et ad Philemonem. Edited by ARTUR LANDGRAF. (Publications in Mediaeval Studies, ed. Philip S. Moore, C. S. C., Vol. 2.) Notre Dame, Indiana, 1944, pp. 447-651.

This forms the third part of the anonymous Cambridge Commentary on the Pauline Epistles, the first (1937) being on Romans, the second (1939) on Corinthians-Ephesians, and the fourth and last (now in press) on the Epistle to the Hebrews, all under the editorship of Artur Landgraf, recently elevated to the See of Bamberg. It is a word-by-word commentary on the Epistles, with an exegesis essentially sound, even if occasionally somewhat strained, and with supporting citations, especially from Abelard (termed simply *philosophus*), but also from Gregory the Great, Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose, Ambrosiaster, Haimo, Hilary, Gilbertus Universalis, and—of pagan authors—Horace and Seneca. The whole, ably and carefully edited, is a valuable contribution to knowledge of the mediaeval school of Abelard.

L. H. G.

The Church in Latvia. By ALFRED BILMANIS. New York: Drauga Vēsts, 1945. 35 pp.

This little pamphlet by the Latvian Minister in Washington gives, in brief and complete form, the history of Latvian Christianity from the time of the first missionaries to the capture of Riga by the Soviets in 1944. It gives a good picture of the struggle of the Latvian people against domination by the Germans and Russians during the centuries, and emphasizes the fact that the Latvians, whether in the Roman Catholic or the Lutheran period, have always been part of Western civilization and have never been at home in the Eastern Orthodox world. The mere recital of the plain facts of history offers the most convincing reason why Latvia should recover its independence and not be submerged in the Soviet Union.

C. A. M.

The Rise of Christian Education. By Lewis Joseph Sherrill. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. xi, 349 pp. $2.50.

Here is a book on religious education which is notably different from other recent volumes. It is not a defense of some special philosophy of religious education. It is not another text-book to add to the flood of texts appearing in the last few years. And it is not—and for that we can be thankful—another manual on methodology. This book is a history of Christianity up to the fifteenth century, with introductory chapters on developments in Jewish culture before the Christian era. A second volume, bringing the history up to date, is to follow.

Dr. Sherrill is acutely aware of the chasm which exists between Christian theology and Christian education. "These two," he says, "Christian faith and Christian education, whom God has joined together and man has so often sought to put asunder, are best seen in their intimate marriage, by means of history." The impetus of this conviction has led him to write a book which has unusual significance. In a series of brief chapters he has sketched the religious life and thought of succeeding periods and, in considerable detail, the educational practices characteristic of each period. The two chapters on New Testament times, "Jesus and the Kingdom of God" and "Jesus and the Character of God," are especially convincing. Dr. Sherrill has no use for the medieval synthesis, and his discussions of the medieval period lack something of the balance and clarity of his treatment of Jewish and early Christian thought.

To compress such a mass of material into a volume of this size is a difficult task, and the product almost inevitably loses something in distinction of style and readability. But this is a good book, a job well done, and it is sure to fulfill its purpose, which is to prove that Christian education is deeply rooted in Christian experience, and that reconstruction in education and in theology are not two processes but one.

Adelaide Case

Prophecy and the Church. By Oswald T. Allis. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1945. ix, 339 pp. $2.50.

This book presents a strong criticism of that mode of biblical interpretation known as Dispensationalism, whose followers are the modern heirs of the Plymouth Brethren, a group which had its genesis in England and Ireland about 1830. Dispensationalism is represented in America today primarily by the *Scofield Reference Bible.* Its adherents hold that the Church age is a "parenthesis" interrupting the fulfillment of God's kingdom promises to his earthly people, Israel. The Church is a "heavenly mystery" completely unknown to the prophets and first revealed to Paul. The "rapture" of the Church may take place "at any moment," and will be followed by a Jewish age in which the kingdom prophecies concerning Israel will be literally fulfilled. John the Baptist and Jesus offered the Jews an earthly kingdom, but the latter rejected it. As a result, God "postponed" the kingdom, and in its place the Church, which has absolutely no connection with mundane affairs, was introduced. The true Church is totally distinct from Christendom, or the professing church, which will be completely apostate when Jesus comes.

Dr. Allis, formerly professor of Old Testament at Princeton Theological Seminary and later at Westminster Theological Seminary, considers Dispensationalism a woeful distortion of the Scriptures. One by one the arguments of the Dispensationalists are refuted, always on biblical grounds. Holding that a literalist view of the Bible is impossible, the author concludes that the "received interpretation" of scripture is not simply a legacy in Protestant thought derived from post-apostolic and Roman Catholic theology, as Scofield claims, but is the interpretation placed on Hebrew prophecy "by the writers of the New Testament themselves," men who clearly believed that the Church was foretold in the Old Testament. It is the Christian Church which alone fulfills the kingdom prophecies.

As for the contention that the "mystery" of the Church was first revealed to Paul, it is clear for one thing that he shared the revelation with the other apostles. In actuality the kingdom announced by Jesus and John was essentially spiritual. And, finally, to claim a future apostate Church is to make Christ expect to accomplish "through a Jewish remnant and by His visible presence what He has declared He will accomplish through His Church by the power of His Holy Spirit."

So far, so good. But the argument between Dr. Allis and the Dispensationalists is simply one of civil war within strongly conservative ranks. The author says in his preface, "all who accept the Bible as the Word of God and hold it to be the only infallible rule of faith and practice should be able to stand shoulder to shoulder in their opposition to Modernism and Higher Criticism, . . . unfortunately, Dispensationalism introduces . . . a cleavage which tends very seriously to undermine that solidarity and harmony with which Evangelicals should face the assaults of scepticism and unbelief." While "Modernism and Higher Criticism" may join with Dr. Allis in refuting Dispensationalism, they must part company with him when, for example, he finds in the seventieth week referred to in Daniel 9 "the prediction of that great climactic event upon which the Christian Church is founded, the atoning death of the Messiah. . . ."

An important practical implication of the Dispensationalist view concerns the Jewish question. Dispensationalists are thorough-going Zionists; Israel must return to its own land before it can obtain the kingdom. The author sees the solution in another direction: the hope of the Jew lies in the acceptance of the Christian Gospel. We may wonder, however, whether one or the other of these possibilities is the only way to seek to overcome the tragedy of the Jew.

ARTHUR ROY ECKARDT

Mitri, or the Story of Prince Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin, 1770-1840. By DANIEL SARGENT. New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co. Inc., 1945. 327 pp. $3.50.

This well written biography of Prince Gallitzin, the first Roman Catholic priest to be trained and ordained in the United States, is a fascinating book.

It illustrates the difficulties that the Church had in winning a foothold under the hard conditions of the American frontier, so different from those that were usual in the Europe of the day. It also gives a striking picture of "Mitri" himself, a man of real sanctity and devotion, but also a man as impetuous and uncontrollable as his relatives in Russia who had remained loyal to Orthodoxy, and had indulged their great capacities for leadership in diplomacy and the army without paying attention to the desires of their equals, much less their social inferiors. The book is both instructive and delightful, and its only defect lies in the spelling of many Russian names. The priest adopted the spelling, Gallitzin, but the original name was Golytsin, and it was usually written in French as Galitzine. The same confusion is found in most of the Russian names cited, but this is a small blemish considering the wealth of valuable material included and the general tone of the book, which illustrates the true character of this remarkable missionary with all of its strange defects and real virtues.

C. A. M.

Daniel Evans: Teacher, Preacher, Theologian. Edited by RAYMOND CALKINS. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1944. ix, 236 pp. $2.00.

This book is largely biographical, and it is good biography. The life of Daniel Evans had its dramatic episodes, which make the account very readable. He enters the American scene, an immigrant from Wales, at the age of three. His early childhood is part of the struggle of a family of seven to gain a living without the help of a father. There followed eleven years of toil in a coal mine, and the awakening of the mind to the possibilities of knowledge and the freedom that may come from knowledge. There is the account of his triumphant struggle to gain an education, in spite of the handicaps created by a lack of early schooling; and the fruition of his aims at Bangor Seminary, Bowdoin College, and Andover Seminary. His life achieves its earthly fulfillment in teaching others the truth that makes men free, by successive professorships at Andover Seminary, Andover-Harvard, and Andover-Newton Theological Schools. Interwoven through this main drama are such lesser dramas as his part in the legal battle involving the interpretation of creeds which finally separated the Andover and Harvard Divinity Schools, and his leadership in the protest against the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions for accepting a gift of $100,000 from John D. Rockefeller. Altogether, the life of Daniel Evans illustrates and justifies his own description of the religious life in man, that no matter how humble the beginnings, "the supernal light shines upon him. The tides of the divine life roll in and break upon him. God has his abiding place in the human soul."

One thing which emerges from the account is that Daniel Evans was a true liberal, at a time when liberalism required courageous defense. He would not be bound to creeds, and contested vigorously the decision of the court that the

original Andover creed must be fully subscribed to. A true liberal, in his own words, is one who "will try to save the truths which the Creeds were trying to safeguard, and to which they gave imperfect expression, and hold to these truths of the Creeds, while he expresses them in ways more satisfactory to his own mind" (p. 159). This attitude toward creeds is reflected also in those utterances in which he gives religion priority over theology. Further, Evans was ready to welcome a reciprocal relation between science and religion, and he did not shrink from lecturing to Southern audiences on religion and science the year after the notorious Scopes trial in Tennessee. His liberalism expressed itself also in what he termed an "empathetic" consideration of the thoughts and writings of others, which meant the attempt to see the thoughts of others from within their own minds. It marked his typical approach in his teaching. In short, his religion was that of a free mind, so well described in his own words as "accepting the 'Promethean challenge' to face the facts of life and the forces of the universe with an open . . . mind" (p. 197).

Liberalism did not in his case, however, result in shortening his range of vision; he accepted the full implications and the furthest reaches of his thinking. He was not satisfied with the shrunken boundaries of the intellectual life as presented by either humanism or naturalism. It is unfortunate that the book does not offer more of the process of thinking by which he arrived at his criticism of these philosophies. But in his lecture on "The Meaning and Value of Religion," he asserts his unequivocal conviction that religion is autonomous, that it is distinctive, and sui generis. "The divine meaning of religion is its greater significance," he declares, (p. 189) and again, "religion thus creates for us the world of souls in which we have a larger and deeper fellowship than we can have elsewhere." So, also, in his interpretation of the ethics of Jesus he demands that the transcendent perspective, consisting of "life in God and out from God," be maintained as the central point from which the teachings of Jesus must be understood. His own statement of what his religion meant can best convey its full implications: "My thought has moved more and more within the realm of experience, considered comprehensively, and from its circumference in relation to the world to its center in God. For me religion has come to mean, by the arduous pursuit of my mind, the ultimate and the intimate and the eternal finality of the soul's relation to God" (p. 145).

ANDREW BANNING

From Gods to Dictators: Psychology of Religions and Their Totalitarian Substitutes. By PRYNS HOPKINS. Girard, Kansas: Haldeman-Julius Publications, 1944. 168 pp. $1.65. Paper, $1.00.

A psychoanalyst applies his special knowledge to the field of religion by means of cross-sections of certain cults and rituals. In calling this book a simple outline of comparative religion, one must not overlook the fact that it is written with a certain aim which seems, to this reviewer, to be the admission

that religion can be pacifistic, and yet be unable to set right a world that is out-of-joint. For, neither magic nor religion nor science nor their substitutes, have ever achieved an integrated world.

As for the four modern substitutes for religion—National Socialism, Fascism, the Imperialism of the "New Order in Asia," and Communism—the verdict is that they failed completely to establish any good world order. Moreover, "Whatever be the political outcome of the totalitarian systems, they are not likely to sound the knell of religious or ethical systems having an altruistic content. These persisted despite the breakup of the old Roman world, they survived the vaunted victories of nineteenth century materialism, and are unlikely to succumb before the onset of the deified national state."

Though the author, of course, refuses to deal with all the twigs of the religious stem, under headings such as "Portals to Paradise," "Religious Ways of Releasing Energy," "Woe and Wickedness," "Saints and Slayers of Monsters," he brings in too great a number of particular cases which prove no point clearly because they are not well classified. Thus, in the chapter entitled "New Heavens for Old," the Mother Goddess appears along with God's revelation in the German Leader.

Since the author follows Freud rather closely, we need not be surprised that he regards religion from the same viewpoint. How, then, can he be expected to discriminate delicately between the epistemological, psychological, and existential layers in the notion of knowledge (gnosis, *vidya*) even in the discussion of *jnāna*? But, what matters even more, is that the historical outline of Christianity seems to have been written without any consultant at hand. Here we are confronted with such monstrosities as the statement that "the Eastern Church" (a Church based on the holy mystery in the divinity of the Savior) "largely adopted the Aryan heresy," which occurs twice in the book.

KARL E. BETH

The Arts and Religion. Edited by ALBERT E. BAILEY. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. xiv, 180 pp. $2.50.

This publication of the Ayer Lectures of the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School makes a contribution to an important field of study, namely, the relation of religion to the arts. Unfortunately it suffers from the lack of unity inevitable in a series of lectures by men from different fields of interest. Some of the subjects are dealt with from the point of view of origins and historical development, and others from the viewpoint of the contemporary scene. Obviously so brief a work can barely scratch the surface of so vast and fertile a field.

In his Introduction, Dr. Bailey describes art and religion as instinctive phenomena—"universal and aboriginal"—bound together at the beginning by magic. To this generalization it may be objected that in some primitive cultures of today art and religion "are kept definitely apart" (Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, p. 38). There is no necessary connection between art and

religion or magic, though it is true, of course, that a great deal of the world's supreme art has been "religious art." In the first lecture, "The Expression of Religion in Painting and Sculpture," Dr. Bailey divides his subject into three categories: objective art, that is, the representation of religious subjects for the purposes of worship, or education; subjective art, or "art as Bhakti," in which the artist performs his task as an act of religious devotion; and "the art of social conviction and protest." In his discussion of this modern category, he omits, strangely enough, the name of Diego de Rivera, surely one of its greatest exponents.

In Lecture II, "The Expression of Religion in Architecture," Professor Kenneth John Conant, of Harvard, makes the interesting point that "the first element of the sublime" in Christian architecture came in from the imperial tradition, since as an organ of the state, the Church "had to express something of imperial majesty," but that it reached "true sublimity" through the "bold imaginative powers" of the newly Christianized barbarians, who added the staged tower, or spire, to the basilica.

The third Lecture, by Professor Henry Augustine Smith, of Boston University, "The Expression of Religion in Music," is devoted to the development of Western music "as the child of the church." Like Plato, Professor Smith believes that, because of its power to arouse the emotions, music is a dangerous form of art which "will, in control of an unchaste spirit, drown human life in the deepest sea." But rightly used, it may contribute nobly to the basic patterns of worship: "Vision or Awareness of God, Vitality or Exaltation, Humility or Confession, Illumination or Instruction, and Dedication or Consecration."

The last Lecture, "The Dramatist and the Minister," by Professor Fred Eastman, of the Chicago Theological Seminary, is a plea to the minister to learn from the dramatist how to "think imaginatively," and learn how to dramatize religion, since "It cannot be presented effectively in abstractions." A service should be built like a drama, that is, to lead through a sequence of emotions toward the desired total effect—"a sense of fellowship with God and man."

M. B.

The Nature of Maine: As Seen by a Teacher of Philosophy, with 177 Photographs of Beautiful Maine. By MARION J. BRADSHAW. Bangor, Maine: Printed for the Author, 1945. 176 pp. $4.00.

In a highly personal, unconventional, and uneven book of essays, Professor Bradshaw discloses his many interests. One should not be misled by the title, for what the author has written has relatively little specifically to do with the State of Maine, but with disarming frankness deals mainly with his own state of mind. The volume consists of twelve miscellaneous essays, which reveal a versatile, lively, and thoroughly American personality, but which are rarely intended to tax the reader's powers of consecutive thought. The studies are on subjects religious, ethical, philosophical, and biographical. The comments on theology itself, and on the character of Jesus, are well to the left of usual ortho-

dox positions. In a personally revealing chapter attacking Dr. Fosdick's pacifism, Professor Bradshaw aptly notes Lincoln's willingness to lead the country into a most regrettable war, believed just but never declared to be "holy."

Throughout his more speculative passages the author advocates the rational processes chiefly in so far as they save thought from the errors of absolutism. He handles theology with the pragmatic touch of Maine fishermen handling their gasoline engines. He pleasantly tells us that he has himself been a man of action, the most active iceman in Cleveland, winner of fifteen varsity letters at Hiram College, a bank clerk, a football coach, a printer, a teacher of psychology, a minister of the Gospel, in addition to being a writer on theology, philosophy, aesthetics, and nature, and, last but hardly least, a well known photographer. Besides, he is an experienced traveler, notably in Russia and the Far East. In this book there is something eminently practical and as clearly limited in his approach to all his subjects. One of his liveliest chapters is not unnaturally that telling of the relief work of *The Sunbeam,* the locally famous vessel of the Maine Sea Coast Mission. In short, he visibly prefers action to imagination. He thinks of a large number of matters, but rarely of more than one at a time.

This lively but prosaic attitude is strikingly revealed in the hundred and seventy-seven landscape photographs that incongruously illustrate the essays, or more accurately, are printed with them. The eclectic mind appears in both the writing and the views. Through a lack of imagination the pictures, though often attractive, fail to convey the spirit behind the physical scene in Maine as skilfully as might be desired. It is unfortunate that no mention is made of any of the painters who have made this region—with the possible exception of Mexico City—the most fruitful resort of artists in the Western Hemisphere. The photographs still more signally fail to convey the nature of the people of Maine, for Professor Bradshaw's book throughout, his theories notwithstanding, deals far more with abstractions than with people. Essays so discursive as these might be expected to have glanced more often at social problems. And the familiar essay might well be written with a lighter touch. In brief, fault may only too readily be found with many aspects of the book, which nevertheless remains vivid, interesting, and most emphatically full of surprises.

HENRY W. WELLS

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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